Detection of Denial-of-Service Attacks Based on Computer Vision Techniques by Tan, Z et al.
“© 2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in 
any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, 
creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of 
this work in other works.”
For Peer Review Only
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, VOL., NO., 1
Detection of Denial-of-Service Attacks Based on
Computer Vision Techniques
Zhiyuan Tan, Member, IEEE, Aruna Jamdagni, Xiangjian He‡, Senior Member, IEEE,
Priyadarsi Nanda, Senior Member, IEEE, Ren Ping Liu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Jiankun Hu, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Detection of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks has
attracted researchers since 1990s. A variety of detection systems
has been proposed to achieve this task. Unlike the existing
approaches based on machine learning and statistical analysis,
the proposed system treats traffic records as images and detection
of DoS attacks as a computer vision problem. A multivariate
correlation analysis approach is introduced to accurately depict
network traffic records and to convert the records into the
respective images. The images of network traffic records are used
as the observed objects of our proposed DoS attack detection
system, which is developed based on a widely used dissimilarity
measure, namely Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD). EMD takes
cross-bin matching into account and provides a more accurate
evaluation on the dissimilarity between distributions than some
other well-known dissimilarity measures, such as Minkowski-
form distance Lp and X2 statistics. These unique merits facilitate
our proposed system with effective detection capabilities. To
evaluate the proposed EMD-based detection system, ten-fold
cross-validations are conducted using KDD Cup 99 data set and
ISCX 2012 IDS Evaluation data set. The results presented in
the system evaluation section illustrate that our detection system
can detect unknown DoS attacks and achieves 99.95% detection
accuracy on KDD Cup 99 data set and 90.12% detection accuracy
on ISCX 2012 IDS evaluation data set with processing capability
of approximately 59,000 traffic records per second.
Index Terms—Denial-of-Service, anomaly-based detection,
earth mover’s distance, computer vision
I. INTRODUCTION
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DoS) attacks have emerged asone of the most severe network intrusive behaviours
and have posed serious threats to the infrastructures of com-
puter networks and various network-based services [1]. These
attacks can be launched by deliberately exploiting system
vulnerabilities of a victim (e.g., a host, a router, or an entire
network) or flooding a victim with a large volume of useless
network traffic to occupy the designated resources (e.g., net-
work bandwidth, processor time and memory). DoS attacks
can result in a serious interruption to a victim. Moreover, in
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today’s Internet, attack toolkits are readily available and easy
to use [2] [3]. Any Internet users can use these toolkits to
launch attacks with minimum efforts. Sometimes, the users of
the attack toolkits may not even have any knowledge about
network security.
Therefore, a significant number of works in recent years
have concentrated on building systems for defending DoS
attacks. The defence mechanisms residing in these systems
are generally classified as detection, prevention, mitigation and
response [4]. Detection is the very first step to protect against
DoS attacks among the aforementioned defence mechanisms,
and it is required to provide prompt reaction and high detection
accuracy.
In general, detection mechanisms can be divided into
two major categories, namely misuse-based detection and
anomaly-based detection. The former detection mechanism
employs signature or rule matching in its recognition of in-
trusive behaviours. Systems based on misuse detection mecha-
nism can achieve high detection rates in known attacks [5]–[7].
However, they are incapable of detecting any unknown mali-
cious behaviours or even variants of existing attacks. Further-
more, generating signatures for previously unseen attacks is a
labour intensive task, which heavily involves network security
expertise. In contrast, anomaly-based detection mechanism
uses a different detection methodology that monitors and
labels any network activities presenting significant deviation
from the respective legitimate traffic profiles as suspicious ob-
jects. Since these profiles are built on the knowledge of normal
network behaviours, anomaly-based detection mechanism is
able to identify previously unknown attacks. As such, it is
widely adopted in the research community [8].
Since the last decade, a variety of anomaly-based detection
systems has been proposed. However, the existing systems
suffer from a common issue in achieving high accuracy in
classifying both normal traffic and attack traffic [9]. This
is partly because most of these systems only use several
simple network features of incoming traffic (e.g., IP header
fields) in modelling normal network traffic, and overlook the
correlations between the network features. Though there is a
current research trend to make use of the correlations between
the features in intrusion detection, most of the proposed sys-
tems [10]–[12] are based on traditional statistical correlation
analysis techniques, which are only capable of studying the
correlations between the features (variables) in a given sample
set. The properties inherited from these traditional statistical
correlation analysis techniques make these anomaly-based
detection systems incapable of recognising individual attack
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records hidden in a sample set.
In addition, more sophisticated classifiers are demanded
to help improve detection accuracy. The techniques used in
computer vision tasks are the potential candidates. Due to
some commonalities shared between DoS attack detection and
computer vision tasks, such as image retrieval and object shape
recognition. Normal traffic to DoS attack detection can be
equivalent to queries to image retrieval tasks or object shape
recognition tasks. DoS attacks to our detection task can be
interpreted as the images or the object shapes that do not
match the queries. Therefore, computer vision techniques can
provide intuitive and effective solutions to the problem.
In this paper, we propose a more sophisticated anomaly-
based system for detecting DoS attacks. The proposed system
is designed to overcome all the aforementioned issues and to
solve the detection problem from the perspective of computer
vision. Our system has three key features:
• First, the hidden correlations between the features of net-
work traffic are extracted using our previously developed
Multivariate Correlation Analysis (MCA) technique [13],
which provides accurate network traffic characterisation,
• Second, individual attack records hidden in the crowd can
be easily recognised by our system. This is owing to one
of the merits (i.e., the capability of analysing correlation
between features within individual records) of our MCA
technique.
• Finally, to improve the detection accuracy, our proposed
system adopts the principle of object shape recognition
and Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [14] (a robust dis-
tance metric) in the design of attack detectors. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first time that EMD has ever
been applied to the field of network DoS attack detection.
This new anomaly-based DoS attack detection system dif-
fers the work presented in this paper from our recent study
published in [13]. To improve the accuracy and to accelerate
the computation of our MCA approach [13], Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) is employed in this new detection system
to reduce the dimensionality (noise) of data. Furthermore,
unlike the previous work, inbound network traffic records
are converted into two-dimensional images before detection
is conducted. More importantly, EMD instead of Mahalanobis
distance is utilised in this work to measure the dissimilarity
between observed inbound traffic records and a pre-built
normal profile.
The proposed DoS attack detection system is evaluated
using the KDD Cup 99 data set [15] and ISCX 2012 IDS
evaluation data set [16] on DoS attacks. The experimental
results on these two data sets are compared against three state-
of-the-art detection systems (i.e., network intrusion detection
system based on covariance feature space [11], triangle-area-
based nearest neighbours approach [12] and DoS attack de-
tection system using TAM-based MCA [13]) and four Naive
Bayes (NB) based detection approaches [46] respectively. The
overall evaluation shows that our detection system achieves
99.95% accuracy on KDD Cup 99 data set, which outperforms
the systems discussed in [11] and [12] by 2.06% and 7.8%
respectively and is as good as the system suggested by [13].
Meanwhile, our proposed detection system achieves 90.12%
accuracy on the up-to-date ISCX 2012 IDS evaluation data
set, which shows advantages over the four NB-based detection
approaches [46]. The computational complexity of our system
is then discussed and compared with the two state-of-the-
art detection systems, which also employ correlation analysis
techniques in design.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We present a
review on prior research works on anomaly-based detection
and EMD in Section II. Section III proposes a new DoS
attack detection system based on computer vision techniques.
Section IV illustrates performance evaluations of our proposed
detection system on KDD Cup 99 data set and ISCX 2012 IDS
evaluation data set. Section V presents a systematic analysis
on the computational complexity and the time cost of the
proposed detection system. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
In order to provide more detailed background information
about our work, a literature review is conducted in this section.
However, our intention is not to give a comprehensive survey
on the topic. Instead, we only cover the most related studies
on anomaly-based detection, EMD and the applications of
EMD in the field of network security. Moreover, as our work
employs the mechanism of network-based anomaly intrusion
detection, all the detection systems covered in this section are
limited to network-based systems unless and otherwise being
specified.
A. Anomaly-based Detection
Anomaly-based detection mechanism shows promising re-
sults in detecting zero-day attacks [17] that exploit previously
unknown system vulnerability, and it has less dependency on
domain knowledge. Recent work on DoS attack detection pri-
marily adopts this concept. Techniques used in these anomaly-
based detection systems can be divided into two categories,
namely machine learning and statistical analysis.
Machine learning techniques help in classification of ob-
served objects using known properties learnt from training
data. Lee et al. [18] built a Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attack detection approach based on hierarchical clus-
tering method. The approach could detect different phases of
a DDoS attack instance. However, the final detection accuracy
of the approach was not revealed. Tajbakhsh et al. [19] pro-
posed two classification approaches, called Association Based
Classification (ABC) and ABC extension. Models of different
classes were described using fuzzy association rules. The ABC
and the ABC extension were applied for misuse-based detec-
tion and anomaly-based detection respectively. They achieved
encouraging results except on novel attacks. Mukkamala et
al. [20] proposed an ensemble design of intrusion detection
system, where Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Support
Vector Machines (SVM) and Multivariate Adaptive Regression
Splines (MARS) techniques were used. The experimental re-
sults show that this system achieves 99.97% detection accuracy
and outperforms any of the individual techniques. However,
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the ensemble detection system involves time-consuming com-
putation and cannot work real-time. Yu et al. [21] suggested
a two-tier hierarchical detection system using SVM. The
hierarchical structure and one-class SVM (i.e., Support Vector
Data Description) equip it with the advantage in classifying
various attacks into their appropriate classes. This detection
system achieved its best attack detection rate of 99.40% using
3 selected Management Information Based (MIB) features.
Statistical analysis techniques have been employed to con-
duct investigation into attributes of network traffic packets
and to determine a rationale threshold for discriminating
attacks from the legitimate traffic. Wang et al. [22] proposed a
sequential Change-Point Monitoring (CPM) approach for the
detection of DoS attacks. A non-parametric Cumulative Sum
(CUSUM) algorithm was used in the CPM to evaluate the
significance of the changes of traffic patterns and to determine
the appearance of DoS attacks. The CPM is more suitable for
analysing a complex network environment. Whereas in [22],
CPM was only tested using SYN flooding attacks. Moreover,
its performance is possibly affected by network indiscipline.
Kim and Reddy [23] suggested a statistical-based approach
to detect anomalies at an egress router. Discrete wavelet
transform was used to transform address correlation data (i.e.,
the correlation of destination IP addresses, port numbers and
the number of flows). This statistical-based detection technique
provides a solution to detect outgoing anomalous traffic at
source networks. Thatte et al. [24] developed a bivariate Para-
metric Detection Mechanism (bPDM) operating on aggregate
traffic. The bPDM applies the Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) on two aggregate traffic statistics (i.e., packet
rate and packet size), and it alleges an anomaly only when a
rise in the traffic volume is associated with a change in the
distribution of packet-size.
Despite the afore-discussed systems or approaches show
innovation and promise in different aspects of attack detection,
they still suffer from relatively high false positive rates. This
is partly because they either neglect the dependency and
correlation between features/attributes or do not manage to
fully exploit the correlation [25]. Some recent studies attempt
to cope with this problem by taking full advantage of the
correlation in their designs. Thottan and Ji [10] developed an
abrupt change detection approach which employs statistical
signal processing technique based on the Auto-Regression
(AR) process. An operation matrix (A), which retained “the
ensemble average of the two point spatial cross-correlation of
the abnormality vectors estimated over a time interval T ” [10],
participated in the computation of the value of abnormality
indicator. Although this detection approach has shown to be
effective in detecting several network anomalies, it is still an
open topic for now how to manage features with various time
granularities. Jin et al. [11] proposed a statistical detection
approach using covariance matrix to represent the multivariate
correlation for sequential samples. Although the approach
achieves good detection rates, it is vulnerable to attacks that
linearly change all monitored features. Moreover, it can only
label a group of observed samples as legitimate or attack
traffic without distinguishing individual attack traffic records
from the crowd. Tsai and Lin [12] designed a new detection
approach based on the nearest neighbours technique. The
approach applied a triangle area based method to discover the
correlation between observed objects and the cluster centroids
pre-identified using the K-means algorithm. The extracted cor-
relation was then used in the nearest neighbours algorithm for
classification. Though this detection approach was carefully
designed to be immune to the problem of linear changing
features, the dependency on prior knowledge of anomalous
behaviours dilutes its accuracy and reliability on correlation
discovery. The detection effectiveness of these systems is
reported in Section IV-C.
In our previous works [13] [26], mechanisms to overcome
the above weaknesses were studied and the corresponding
solutions were proposed. A multi-tier Real-time Payload-
based IDS (RePIDS) was proposed in [26], where a novel
geometrical structure based analysis technique was deliber-
ately designed for feature correlation extraction. Mahalanobis
Distance Map (MDM) was used to reveal the correlation
between packet payload features. In [13], we attempted to
remove the dependency on network traffic packet payload
by diverting to connection-based features. This eliminates the
restriction of the use of IDS to encrypted network traffic. A
Multivariate Correlation Analysis (MCA) approach proposed
in [13] embraces triangle area in estimating the correlation be-
tween features. This MCA approach equips our proposed DoS
attack detection system with encouraging detection accuracy
and higher efficiency. The details of the MCA approach will
be discussed in Section III-A5a. However, the previously pro-
posed MCA-based detection system is based on Mahalanobis
distance, which does not support partial matching. A more
sophisticated distance metric, such as the EMD, can enhance
the accuracy of detection. Detailed introduction and discussion
will be presented in Sections II-B and III-A4.
In addition, although the work shown in [27] [28] [29]
demonstrates good attempts of adopting some ideas of com-
puter vision into intrusion detection problems, these schemes
do not take into account the correlation between various
features. Specifically, they are only proposed to represent
instances of network packet header data (e.g., traffic volume
or port numbers) as images. In comparison, however, to
reformulate the intrusion detection problem as a computer
vision task can further exploit the merits of this innovative
fusion and motivate research on this topic.
B. Earth Mover’s Distance
Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) was originally proposed by
Rubner et al. [30] as a cross-bin dissimilarity measure to
evaluate the perceptual difference between two distributions.
It was defined as the minimal cost of the transformation from
one distribution to another. EMD supports partial matching
and outperforms bin-by-bin distances in matching perceptual
dissimilarity. This benefits from the extension of the concept
of a distance from between corresponding elements to between
the entire distributions, in which the ground distance reflects
the notion of nearness between the elements in the distribu-
tions. Quantisation and other binning problems of histograms
can be further avoided by taking the above ideas. Further
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discussion on the theoretical advantages and suitability of
computer vision techniques, including EMD, in DoS detection
can be found in Section III-A4
1) Earth Mover’s Distance Approaches: A considerable
amount of research interest on EMD has been raised by
the early work [30] [31] from Rubner et al., who adopted
transportation problem [32] in modelling distribution compar-
ison and suggested to compare the signatures of distributions
rather than to compare histograms. The computation time of
EMD is reduced owing to the advantage that signatures are
usually the compressed (clustered) versions of histograms.
However, simplex algorithm [33], applied to solve EMD, has a
supercubic empirical time complexity in Ω(N3)∩O(N4) for
a signature with N elements, which limits the applications
of EMD to non-time-sensitive tasks mostly. Grauman and
Darrell [34] proposed a fast contour matching algorithm using
an approximate EMD, which utilised embedding technique to
accelerate the computational speed. Thus, the EMD between
two sets of descriptive local features can be quickly computed
in the complexity of O(Nd log(4)), where N is the number
of features, d is their dimension, and 4 is the diameter of
the feature space. Moreover, Ling and Okada [14] suggested
an alternative fast version for EMD in which L1 distance
was used as ground distance to compute the dissimilarity
between histograms. An efficient tree-based algorithm was
developed replacing the original simplex algorithm to solve the
proposed EMD-L1 in a more efficient fashion. It was shown
in [14] that EMD-L1 had an average empirical complexity of
O(N2) that was computationally much less expensive than
the original EMD. EMD-L1 was applied to shape recognition
and interest point matching. Based on the same motivation
that was to speed up the original EMD, Differential Earth
Mover’s Distance (DEMD) was recently presented in [35]. The
authors proposed applying sensitivity analysis of the simplex
algorithm to solve EMD. The signatures of distributions were
used to represent the interested objects in visual tracking.
Considering the efficiency and the scenarios for which the
above approaches were proposed, EMD-L1 is believed to be
the best candidate for our task.
2) Applications of Earth Mover’s Distance in Network
Security: EMD has been widely used to solve many problems
in computer vision, such as image retrieval [30] [31], contour
matching [34], object shape recognition [14], interest point
matching [14] and visual tracking [35] etc. It is still a new
technique to computer and network security, and only a small
amount of work based on EMD has been found in the
literature.
In this paragraph, some of the most closely related works
on intrusive behaviour detection are introduced. For instance,
an approach for phishing web page detection was presented
in [36], where web pages were first converted into normalised
images and then were described using signatures (i.e., features
consisting of dominant colour category and the respective
centroid coordinates). Visual similarities between a test web
page and protected web pages were assessed using the EMD
[31] between their image signatures. If the similarity between
the tested web page and a particular protected web page
exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the tested page is deemed
as a phishing web page. In [37], Yen and Reiter developed
a test method to differentiate between Plotters (i.e., bots)
and Traders (i.e., normal peers) on a Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
network. EMD [31] helped evaluate the similarity between the
per-destination interstitial time distributions of hosts. Plotters
normally showed similar patterns in distribution, but those of
Traders tended to be far apart from each other. The hosts were
then grouped into the clusters with respect to the similarity
of their timing patterns. Micarelli and Sansonetti proposed a
case-based anomaly intrusion detection approach in [39]. This
approach monitored the output parameters and the arguments
of system calls (i.e., execve(), chmod(), chown(), exit(), open()
and setuid()) revoked by instances of applications on a host. A
signature (consisting of the centroids of the clusters of system
calls and the corresponding weights) was used to represent an
instance of an application. Then, the signature was compared
with the case (represented by the signature of the generic
instance of the same application) stored in the profile database
using EMD [31]. Behaviours of the system call sequences
performing significantly non-compliant with the corresponding
profiles inferred that attacks were underway.
Although the above studies have made contributions to
the integration between EMD and the respective proposed
detection approaches, none of the approaches has been de-
signed particularly for DoS attack detection. Additionally,
these studies employ the original EMD rather than any other
enhanced versions. The heavy computational complexity of
the original EMD prevents them from being applied in prompt
detection tasks. The theoretical advantages of EMD and the
shortcomings in recent applications of EMD motivate us to
explore a better means to integrate EMD-L1 (a fast version of
EMD) and DoS attack detection task.
III. DOS ATTACK DETECTION SYSTEM
As a core component of a comprehensive network secu-
rity scheme, a DoS attack detection system defends internal
networks under the same administrative control from being
affected by the imposed malicious traffic. An overview of our
proposed DoS attack detection system architecture is given in
this section, in which detection mechanisms, system frame-
work and relevant algorithms are discussed. In particular, the
advantages and suitability of using computer vision techniques
in DoS attack detection are discussed in Section III-A4.
A. General Mechanisms of the Detectors
1) Traffic Monitoring at the Destination: Our proposed
DoS attack detection system is deployed at the gateway of
a network to monitor and analyse incoming network traffic.
This reduces the overhead in detecting malicious activities
by concentrating only on relevant inbound traffic. This also
enables our detector to provide protection which is best fit for
the targeted internal network because legitimate traffic profiles
residing in the detectors are developed for a smaller number
of network services.
2) Sample-by-sample Detection: Our system investigates
traffic samples individually in the process of detection. This
releases our system from the dependency on the assumption
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made by the group-based detection mechanism [11] that the
network traffic samples in a tested group are all from the
same distribution (class). Moreover, our approach can detect
attacks in a prompt manner with less delay than the group-
based detection approach. Besides, it has been proven that the
sample-by-sample detection mechanism can always achieve
equal or better detection precision than the group-based de-
tection mechanism in a general network scenario [13].
3) Anomaly-based Detectors: Anomaly-based detection
mechanism [8] is adopted in our approach. It facilitates the
detection of any DoS attacks demonstrating deviation from the
normal traffic profiles without requiring any relevant expertise.
Thus, labour-intensive attack analysis and frequent update of
attack signature database in the case of misuse-based detection
system are avoided. Meanwhile, the mechanism enhances
the robustness of the proposed detectors and makes them
harder to be evaded since the dependency on attack signatures
has been disconnected. Moreover, without knowing the exact
detection algorithm in use, attackers can merely get the way
to penetrate the defence. This is because they need to generate
an attack that can match the legitimate traffic profiles built by
the specific detection algorithm, which however is a labour-
intensive work, and in-depth expertise in the targeted detection
algorithm is required.
4) Attack Recognition Based on Computer Vision: The
commonalities shared between a DoS attack detection problem
and computer vision tasks (e.g., image retrieval and object
shape recognition) encourage us adopt the principals used in
computer vision into the task of this paper. Normal traffic
profiles to our DoS attack detection system are treated as
queries to image retrieval tasks or shape recognition tasks.
Instances of normal traffic, on one hand, are interpreted as
the images or the shapes that match the queries. DoS attacks,
on the other hand, are interpreted as the unmatched images
or the unmatched shapes. The ideas and techniques used
in computer vision tasks can be introduced to solve the
problems of DoS attack detection. Moreover, computer vision
techniques, namely EMD and its variants, make use of cross-
bin correlation in assessing perceptional dissimilarity between
two images, which contributes higher accuracy than other bin-
to-bin dissimilarity measures (e.g., L1, L2 and X2 distances)
[14]. This coincides to one of the aims of our work that
exploiting correlation of features in detection. In addition,
partial matching, another merit supported by EMD and its
variants, helps further enhance the detection accuracy of the
proposed detection system. This is because this merit allows
our system to adjust its degree of tolerance to the variance of
normal network traffic.
a) EMD-L1: Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [31] was
originally inspired by the intuition that looking for a solution
with the minimum overhead on moving a mass of earth
properly spreading in space to a collection of holes in the same
space. Despite working effectively, the expensive computation
restricts the applications of EMD mainly in offline tasks.
Subsequent research on EMD suggests various techniques to
alleviate the overhead of computation. An equivalent simplifi-
cation, EMD-L1 [14], introduces a new efficient formulation of

































Fig. 1. Decompose a flow
non-sparse structures). L1 (i.e., Manhattan) distance is chosen
as the ground distance in this new formulation, which redefines
the computation of EMD as a “network flow problem”.
With the new formulation, the computational complexity of
EMD can be reduced by one order of magnitude in comparison
with the original formulation using transportation problem.
This is owing to an important property of the L1 distance
that any shortest path between two points on a network can
be decomposed into a collection of edges between neighbour
nodes with a ground distance of one between them. As shown
in Fig. 1, the shortest path between the node (i, j) and the
node (k, l), where i < k and j < l, is decomposed into
a collection of edges (including fi,j;i,j+1, fi,l−1;i,l, fi,l;i+1,l,
fk−1,l;k,l etc.) with ground distances of ones, and its distance
is defined as the summation of the distances of the edges (i.e.,
di,j;k,l = di,j;i,j+1+· · ·+di,l−1;i,l+di,l;i+1,l+· · ·+dk−1,l;k,l).
Using the following notations, the new formulation of EMD
(i.e., EMD-L1) considering only the flows (edges) between
neighbour bins (nodes) is defined. Without loss of generality,
we assume there are two-dimensional histograms with k rows
and q columns and N = k × q bins. I = {(j, p) : 1 ≤ j ≤
k, 1 ≤ p ≤ q} is an index set where (j, p) indicates the index
of a bin (or node) within a histogram. J = {(j, p, c, d) :
(j, p) ∈ I, (c, d) ∈ I} is an index set where (j, p, c, d) is the
index of a flow fj,p;c,d from bin (j, p) to bin (c, d). J1 =
{(j, p, c, d) : (j, p, c, d) ∈ J , dj,p;c,d = 1} denotes an index
set where (j, p, c, d) is the index of a flow fj,p;c,d from bin
(j, p) to bin (c, d), and the two bins are neighbours with a
ground distance of one.
Given histogram Y = {yjp : (j, p) ∈ I}, where yjp is the
bin (j, p) of Y , and histogram Z = {zjp : (j, p) ∈ I}, where
zjp is the bin (j, p) of Z. To compare the two histograms using
EMD-L1, Y and Z are first normalised to two unit masses
(i.e.,
∑
j,p pjp = 1 and
∑
j,p qjp = 1, where pjp and qjp
denote the normalised masses of the earth on the bin (j, p)
of the histogram Y and the bin (j, p) of the histogram Z









(fj,p;c,d − fc,d;j,p) = bjp ∀(j, p) ∈ I
fj,p;c,d ≥ 0 ∀(j, p, c, d) ∈ J1,
(2)
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where bjp is the difference between the two histograms Y
and Z at the bin (j, p), and a flow F satisfying (2) is called a
feasible flow which consists of a number of sub-flows fj,p;c,d.
EMD-L1 can be interpreted as a network flow model, where
each bin (j, p) is treated as a node with weight bjp and has
eight directed flows between itself and its four neighbours.
The intuition of constraint (2) is that the difference between the
total flow entering any node (j, p) on the network and the total
flow leaving the node (j, p) must equal to bjp. The total weight
associated with all the nodes is 0 (i.e.,
∑
(jp)∈I bjp = 0), since
the two histograms Y and Z carry equal weights. Thus, the
task of this network flow modelling of EMD-L1 is to make
all nodes bear zero weights by redistributing the weights via
the flows.
EMD-L1 has significantly simplified the original EMD from
three aspects. First, reducing the number of variables from
N4 to 4N as shown in (1). Second, decreasing the number
of equality constraints by fifty percent. Third, converting all
ground distances to ones, which is essentially important due
to the elimination of the expensive computation of ground
distances. Thus, each sub-flow fj,p;c,d is equivalent to the
respective weighted sub-flow fj,p;c,d×dj,p;c,d, since the corre-
sponding ground distance dj,p;c,d is now set to one. Moreover,
a tree-based algorithm was designed in [14] as an efficient
discrete optimisation solver for EMD-L1 to find a Basic Fea-
sible (BF) solution (i.e., a spanning tree), which satisfies the
constraint (2). The tree-based algorithm significantly boosts
up the process of problem solving and achieves much higher
efficiency than the original simplex algorithm.
b) Reformulation of DoS Attack Detection Problem:
However, it is not an easy mission to formula a network
intrusion detection problem as a computer vision task. The
above idea cannot be applied to an existing detection system
as simple as a plug-and-play component to a computer system.
Since the fact that EMD-L1 was originally designed for object
shape recognition, we cannot straightly use it on either network
traffic payloads or network flow statistics. To achieve the task,
reformulation of the existing detection system needs to be
performed to fill the gap between EMD-L1 and the ordinary
detection. In this study, for instance, the ordinary network
traffic records are converted into a kind of format that is used
to represent images. In other words, a network traffic record,




2Pr · · · f ikPr ]T (1 ≤
i ≤ n) shown in Section III-A5, needs to be rationally
transformed from the original one-dimensional feature vector
into a new two-dimensional feature matrix. Two-dimensional
feature matrix is the common presentation for generic two-
dimensional images. Through the transformation, the network
traffic record to be recognised by EMD-L1 as if it is an image.
Then, EMD-L1 can be applied to measure the dissimilarity
between the transformed network traffic records.
Though the transformation of a network traffic record
sounds simple, it actually cannot be accomplished via a simple
manipulation. The two-dimensional feature matrix must be
able to reveal the correlations between the features and provide
accurate presentation to the respective network traffic record.
To achieve this task, we suggest applying the MCA approach
discussed in Section III-A5a to convert network traffic records.
The approaches supply high quality discriminative features and
facilitate the fusion of intrusion detection and computer vision.
The two-dimensional Triangle Area Maps (TAMs) are taken as
the images of the analysed network traffic records. The TAMs
will be filled into (1) to calculate the EMD-L1 between the
observed network traffic records.
5) Feature Extraction Schemes Based on Multivariate Cor-
relation Analysis: Raw features of inbound network traffic,
such as the ones in [15] and [38], maintain plain or hidden
correlations among themselves. These correlations are often
overlooked in the decision making methods, which rely only
on the plain information coming from the raw features. This
leads to a disadvantage in detection accuracy. In addition,
the occurrence of network intrusions causes changes to these
multivariate correlations so that the changes can be used as
metrics for identifying intrusive activities. It gives us reasons
to make good use of the significant discriminative information
residing in the correlations between the raw features.
Our previously proposed MCA-based scheme [13] is ap-
plied in this paper to help extract these correlations from
the features. In comparison with other approaches shown in
[11] and [12], this MCA approach is proven as advanced in
two respective aspects (i.e., requiring only the knowledge of
current observation in performing analysis, and withstanding
the problem that all features being changed linearly [11]).
Given the data set XPr = [x1Pr x2Pr · · · xnPr ], the
correlative information residing in the ith observation xiPr =
[f i1Pr f
i
2Pr · · · f ikPr ]T (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is extracted using the
TAM-based approach as follows.
a) TAM-based MCA Approach: By contrast, the TAM-
based MCA approach [13] attempts to accomplish the same
task from a different perspective, in which the concept of
triangle area is applied to extract the geometrical correlation
between the jth and pth features in an observation xiPr . To
obtain the triangle formed involving the jth and pth features,
a data transformation is engaged. The observation xiPr is first
projected on the (j, p)-th two-dimensional Euclidean subspace
as shown in (3).







where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ p ≤ k and
j 6= p. Moreover, εj = [ej,1 ej,2 · · · ej,k]T and εp =
[ep,1 ep,2 · · · ep,k]T . The elements in the vectors εj and εp are
all zeros, except the (j, j)-th and the (p, p)-th elements whose
values are ones in εj and εp respectively. The projected point,
yi,j,p, is located on the Cartesian coordinate system in the
(j, p)-th two-dimensional Euclidean subspace with coordinate
(f ijPr , f
i
pPr ). Then, on the Cartesian coordinate system, a
triangle formed by the origin and the projected points of the
coordinate (f ijPr , f
i
pPr ) on the j-axis and the p-axis is found,
and whose area is defined as Trij,p = (‖ (f ijPr , 0) − (0, 0) ‖× ‖ (0, f ipPr ) − (0, 0) ‖)/2, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
1 ≤ p ≤ k and j 6= p. In order to make a complete analysis,
all possible permutations of any two distinct features in the
observation xiPr are extracted and the corresponding triangle
areas are computed. A k-by-k matrix (i.e., a triangle area map)
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where all the triangle areas are arranged on the map in
accordance with their indexes similar to Euclidean distance
map in the EDM-based MCA approach. Additionally, the
values of the elements on the diagonal of the map are set to
zeros (i.e., Trij,p = 0, if j = p), because we only care about
the correlation between each pair of distinct features. For the
data set X , its geometrical multivariate correlations can be
represented as XTAM = {TAM1 TAM2 · · · TAMn}.
B. System Framework
In this section, we deliver the complete framework of
the proposed DoS attack detection system. It elaborates the
detailed processes of dimensionality reduction, normal profile
generation and attack rec gnition. The integration of the
aforementioned mechanisms into the proposed system is also
presented in the discussion below. Our proposed DoS attack
detection system, shown in Fig. 2, is comprised of three
major steps. They are Step 1: Basic Feature Generation, Step
2: Dimensionality Reduction Based on Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and Step 3: Decision Making. Output from
each step is passed down to and used as input in the next
step.
1) Basic Feature Generation: In this step, basic features
are generated from network traffic packets captured at the
destination network. Then, they are applied to construct
records describing statistics for a well-defined time interval.
The detailed process can be found in [15].
2) Dimensionality Reduction Based on PCA: This step
performs dimensionality reduction using PCA for the train-
ing normal traffic records generated in Step 1. The detailed
algorithm presented in Section III-C1 is engaged in this
task. Standing out from the feature reduction techniques, our
suggested dimensionality reduction algorithm does not cause
loss of information by the use of PCA which seeks the optimal
subspace for the best representation of the data. The selected
lower dimensional feature subspace obtained in the current
step is then used in both of the Training Phase and the Test
Phase involved in Step 3 (i.e., Decision Marking) to reduce
the computational overhead.
3) Decision Making: This step consists of Training Phase
and Test Phase. The anomaly-based detection mechanism
discussed in Section III-A3 is adopted in both of the phases.
The detailed introduction to this step is given as follows.
In Training Phase, normal profiles are generated for various
types of legitimate/normal traffic records (i.e., TCP, UDP and
ICMP traffic) using the algorithm detailed in Section III-C2.
The normal traffic records used in this phase are identical
to the set of records involved in Step 2. In the process of
generation, normal profiles are built with the data projected
onto the selected feature subspace recommended by Step 2.
The generated normal profiles (Pro) are stored in the database
and are to be used in attack detection.
In Test Phase, the sample-by-sample detection mechanism
discussed in Section III-A2 and the computer vision based
attack recognition mechanism described in Section III-A4 are
adopted. Images of individual tested records are generated and
compared against the respective normal profiles Pro from the
Training Phase using EMD-L1. As shown in Fig. 5, attack
detection is modelled as a computer vision task, in which
normal profiles are used as queries to retrieve the matched
records (i.e., normal TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic records).
Any unmatched images (records) are determined as attacks.
C. Relevant Algorithms
In this section, a series of algorithms are proposed to equip
our system with the defined functionality. Detailed discussions
are then presented to give insights into the ideas behind.
1) Algorithm for Dimensionality Reduction Based on Prin-
cipal Component Analysis: As a linear mathematical system,
PCA provides insight into the space where the given data
resides. It also helps eliminate distractive noise and seek the
optimal lower dimensional representation for data with a high
dimensionality. The selected low dimensional feature space
with an accurate representation for data makes significant
contribution to accelerate the processing speed of the detection
phase. PCA has been used in other earlier research work [26]
[40] and has shown promising results. Therefore, we suggest
an algorithm shown in Fig. 3 for dimensionality reduction
based on PCA. Different from the work which applied PCA
on dimensionality reduction for network packet payloads [26]
and directly on attack detection [40], PCA is used in this work
to determine the optimal feature subspace for a given set of
network traffic records without containing packet payloads.
In addition, we suggest using a cumulative-variance-based
selection criterion in the feature subspace selection.
Require: Data set X {X contains n instances, and each of
which has t features}




2: Xzm ← X − x¯ {Subtract x¯ from each instance in X}
3: CX ← 1n−1XzmXTzm
4: Obtain Λ and W , which are subject to ΛW = CXW





8: Plot {σ21 , σ22 , . . . , σ2n}
9: Locate the “elbow” on the scree plot and identify the
index (k) of the “elbow” point
10: Wk ← the selected first k eigenvectors of W
11: return Wk
Fig. 3. Algorithm for dimensionality reduction based on the PCA.
Since PCA is driven by the idea that greater contribution
on data representation comes from the eigenvectors which
conserve larger variations (i.e., eigenvalues), a multivariate
analysis is performed to reveal the importance of the eigenvec-
tors in a data space to which the interested data belongs. The
analysis involves a transformation converting the interested
data into a new orthonormalised coordinate system, where the
axes indicate the directions of the eigenvectors and the data is
maximally linearly decorrelated.
In Fig. 3, the algorithm for dimensionality reduction is
proposed to analyse the feature space of a given data set
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Training Normal Traffic Records
Tested Traffic Records
Fig. 2. Framework of our proposed denial-of-service attack detection system
X = [x1 x2 · · · xn], where xi = [f i1 f i2 · · · f it ]T (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
denotes the ith observation with t features. Zero-mean normal-
isation is first conducted on the data set for all the observations
to make the PCA work properly. The zero-mean data set is
represented by Xzm = [(x1 − x¯) (x2 − x¯) · · · (xn − x¯)], in
which x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi. Then, the principal components (i.e.,
eigenvectors) are obtained by performing eigen decomposition
on the sample covariance matrix CX = 1n−1XzmX
T
zm. The
CX is then decomposed into a matrix W and a diagonal matrix
Λ. The two matrices satisfy the condition that ΛW = CXW .
Λ and W are sorted in descending order against the variance
associated to each component. The columns of the matrix W
stand for the eigenvectors (i.e., the principal components) of
the covariance matrix CX , and the elements along the diagonal
of the matrix Λ are the ranked eigenvalues associated with the
corresponding eigenvectors in the matrix W .
To determine the optimal number of principal components
to be retained based on the analysis results from the PCA, a
cumulative-variance-based selection criterion is applied. Cu-
mulative variance σ2i is computed with an increment of one
as described in lines 5 to 7 of Fig. 3 and plotted on the screen.
The “elbow” point on the up-slope plot is located to determine
the first k most influential components. The motivation behind
this assumption is that the cumulative variance increases
rapidly until the “elbow” point, and the curve becomes flat
beyond the point. This infers that the principal components
beyond the “elbow” point retain very small variances and are
not important to the representation of the data. An example
will be given in Section IV-B1 to demonstrate how cumulative
variance plot works. Then, the selected k (1 ≤ k ≤ t) principal
components, namely the eigenvectors in matrix W which are
associated with the first k largest eigenvalues, provide the
best presentation for the original data set and reduce the
dimensionality of the original data space from t to k. Finally,
once the value of k is settled, the optimal feature subspace
will be obtained and denoted by Wk.
2) Algorithm for Normal Profile Generation Based on
MCA: Profiles of legitimate network traffic behaviours are
core components to an anomaly-based detection system. Accu-
rate characterisation to network traffic behaviours is essential
and affects the detection performance of our proposed system
directly. The algorithm for normal profile generation is elabo-
rated in Fig. 4. The TAM-based MCA approach is employed
in the algorithm for charactering legitimate network traffic
behaviours.
Require: Data set X and subspace Wk {X contains n
instances, and each of which has t features. Wk is the
selected first k eigenvectors of W}
1: Initialise DIS {It is an array with n elements denoted
by Disi(1 ≤ i ≤ n)}
2: Initialise XTAM with n k-by-k matrices denoted as
TAM i(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
3: XPr ← X ×Wk {XPr contains n instances, and each
of which has k features}
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: TAM i ← [Trij,p]k×k, where 1 ≤ j, p ≤ k {Triangle
area formed involving the features j and p of XPr
is computed and assigned to the (j, p)-th element in
TAM i}
6: end for




8: for i = 1 to n do
9: Disi ← EMD-L1(TAM i, TAM) {Earth mover’s
distance between TAM i and TAM}
10: end for









13: Pro← (TAM,DIS, Std)
14: return Pro
Fig. 4. Algorithm for normal profile generation based on MCA.
A normal profile is generated based on a given training data
set X and a selected subspace Wk. The normal profile consists
of three elements, namely an image (TAM ) of the mean of
the given training samples, the mean (DIS) and the standard
deviation (Std) of the earth mover’s distances (Disi) between
individual training samples and the mean of the given training
samples.
To develop the normal profile, an algorithm described in Fig.
4 is to be used. Two variables DIS and XTAM are defined
and initialised at the first place. DIS is a 1-by-n array to
record the earth mover’s distances between the given training
samples and their mean. XTAM is a three-dimensional (k-
by-k-by-n) matrix to store the TAMs generated for the given
training samples. The previously mentioned TAM is a k-by-k
matrix and represents the image of the training sample.
The transformation of a training sample from a feature
vector to an image is an important step in the process of
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normal profile generation. It bridges network traffic classi-
fication and computer vision. Since none of the computer
vision techniques is initially designed for the task of network
traffic classification, modification to the existing techniques or
redefinition of the original problem is necessary. Thus, in this
paper we redefine our network traffic classification problem
as a computer vision problem, namely taking network traffic
records as images and building up profile for these images. The
details of the redefinition (transformation) are given below.
Dimensionality reduction is first conducted by projecting
X onto the selected subspace Wk as shown in line 3 of
Fig. 4 before the transformation of the given data set X
commences. This results in a new lower-dimensional rep-
resentation (XPr = [x1Pr x2Pr · · · xnPr ]) for the given
data set. The observation is now represented as xiPr =
[f i1Pr f
i
2Pr · · · f ikPr ]T (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then, TAM i is gen-
erated for each training sample using the corresponding MCA
techniques discussed in Section III-A5a. The mean TAM of
the image TAM is computed as shown in line 7 after the
transformation is completed. Afterwards, the Earth Mover’s
Distance between the image of each training sample and the
image of the mean of the given training samples is calculated
using EMD-L1 defined in (1) and assigned to Disi. Upon
the completion of measuring the Earth Mover’s Distances of
individual training samples to the mean, the distribution of
the the Earth Mover’s Distances is then estimated. The mean
(DIS) and the standard deviation (Std) of the EMDs (Disi)
are computed as given in lines 11 and 12 respectively. Finally,
the normal profile is built.
In order to adapt to change of a network and age out
outdated data from the model, an incremental online ver-
sion of our proposed detection system is introduced as fol-
lows. To compute the incremental version of EMD-L1, we
need to compute the mean (TAM ) for each new legitimate
sample observed. The mean can be updated as TAM =
TAM×n+TAMn+1
n+1 = TAM +
TAMn+1−TAM
n+1 when a new
legitimate sample is seen [41]. This offers a means to automat-
ically update the model and to maintain an accurate up-to-date
view of normal traffic patterns.
3) Algorithm for Attack Detection Based on EMD-L1:
The algorithm presented in Fig. 5 describes the procedure
of attack recognition. To determine whether a tested sample
xtest is legitimate or intrusive, the selected feature subspace
Wk, the pre-generated normal profile Pro and parameter α
are required.
Dimensionality reduction is performed on the tested sample
xtest through projecting the sample onto the selected feature
subspace Wk in order to enhance the detection speed and
accuracy. Then, the transformation of the projected tested
sample xPrtest to an image is conducted. The image is matched
against the pre-determined query (i.e., the normal profile Pro).
The similarity between the image (i.e., TAMtest) of the
tested sample and the mean image (i.e., TAM ) from the
provided normal profile Pro is measured using the EMD-L1
and assigned to Distest.
The tested sample is finally classified as an attack or a
normal record using the criterion depicted in line 4 of Fig. 5.
The lower threshold on the left most hand side and the upper
Require: Tested sample xtest, subspace Wk, normal profile
Pro and parameter α
1: xPrtest ← xtest ×Wk {Project tested sample xtest onto
the subspace Wk}
2: TAMtest ← [Trij,p]k×k, where 1 ≤ j, p ≤ k
3: Distest ← EMD-L1(TAMtest, TAM)






Fig. 5. Algorithm for attack detection based on EMD-L1.
threshold on the right most hand side are both determined by
three parameters DIS, Std and α. The parameters DIS and
Std are suggested by the profile Pro developed in the phase
of normal profile generation using the algorithm given in Fig.
4. The parameter α is ranged from 1 to 3, and it denotes the
range where network traffic records are allowed to be accepted
as legitimate ones in the estimated distribution of the EMDs
learnt during normal profile generation.
IV. SYSTEM EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct evaluations on our proposed DoS
attack detection system using KDD Cup 99 data set [15] and
ISCX 2012 IDS evaluation data set [16], which are labelled
benchmark data sets and publicly available on their respective
online repositories.
KDD Cup 99 data set has been widely used in the domain
of intrusion detection research, and remains active in many
recent cutting-edge research [11] [12] [13] [42]. It has been
recommended for evaluating the performance of an anomaly-
based IDS in detecting new intrusions. Due to the reason that
the primary concern to an anomaly-based IDS is its accuracy
in modelling normal traffic behaviour of a network, the age
of data does not prevent a fair evaluation on the system
[43]. Moreover, testing our approach using KDD Cup 99 data
set contributes convincing evaluations and comparisons with
other related state-of-the-art techniques [11] [12]. However,
the data set has been criticised for redundant records that
prevent algorithms from learning infrequent harmful records
[44]. Thus, the selection of non-redundant data may apply to
avoid this negative impact, but it is a labour-intensive task.
Alternatively, algorithms innately withstand the problem are
more desirable. As one of this kind, the underlying algorithms
of our proposed DoS attack detection system are immune
to the problem because its profiles are built purely based
on legitimate network traffic. Therefore, the aforementioned
problem introduced by the redundant data can be avoided in
our evaluations.
During the evaluations, the 10 percent labelled data subset
of KDD Cup 99 data set is used, where five different types
of DoS attacks (Teardrop, Smurf, Pod, Neptune and Land
attacks) and three types of legitimate traffic (TCP, UDP and
ICMP traffic) are available. All records of the above mentioned
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network traffic from the 10 percent labelled data subset are first
extracted. Then, they are further categorised into six groups
according to their labels. The specific numbers of the filtered
records can be found in [47]
Another evaluation data set, ISCX 2012 IDS evaluation data
set, was generated from a testbed, systemically designed by the
Information Security Centre of Excellence at the University
of New Brunswick. The data set is intended to overcome
the technical issues in other IDS evaluation data sets, and
to provide network traces capturing up-to-date legitimate and
intrusive network behaviours and patterns [16]. This data set
consists of seven days’ capturing with overall 2,450,324 traffic
flows. During the evaluations, Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack traffic from Tuesday’s network trace is used. It
contains 8,720 attack traffic flows. As such, the effectiveness
of our detection system on modern traffic can be evaluated.
A. Evaluation Matrices
Four metrics, namely True Negative Rate (TNR), Detection
Rate (DR), False Positive Rate (FPR) and Accuracy (i.e.
the proportion of the overall samples which are classified
correctly), are used to quantitatively estimate the performance
of our proposed system.
B. Evaluations on Detection Performance
Ten-fold cross-validations are conducted to evaluate the
performance of our proposed DoS attack detection system.
We randomly select 70 percent of the filtered records from
10 percent labelled data subset of KDD Cup 99 data set to
form an evaluation data set A, and select 70 percent of the
DDoS attack traffic flows from Tuesday’s network trace as
well as normal traffic to form an evaluation data set B . This
helps avoid the bias hiding in the sequential data affecting
the normal profile generation and the detection performance
of the proposed system. The evaluation results are reported
in Tables II and III, which illustrate the trade-off between the
FPR and DR as well as Accuracy again different Thresholds.
Since DDoS attacks rely on overwhelming traffic to compro-
mise a target machine, network traffic seen at an aggregation
point better reflects the behaviours of attack instances. As
discussed in Section III-B, an IDS is recommended to position
at an entry point to a protected local network to monitor and
detect anomaly traffic patterns. Thus, the detection accuracy of
the detection system on aggregate traffic reflects its detection
capability. The detailed evaluations to our proposed detection
system are presented as follows.
1) Dimensionality Reduction: Analysis on the selected
filtered legitimate (Normal) traffic is conducted using the
algorithm given in Fig. 3 to help determine the optimal feature
subspace for data representation for the entire training data set.
Three feature subspaces are chosen with respect to normal
TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. The selected feature subspaces
are used in Training Phase (Section IV-B2) and the Test Phase
(Section IV-B3) to supply with accurate representation for
all records. The new lower dimensional representations of
the records are used to train and to test the proposed DoS
detection system. As proposed in Section III-C1, we apply the
TABLE I
THE NUMBERS OF PRINCIPLE COMPONENTS USING IN THE TRAINING
AND TEST FOR VARIOUS NETWORK TRAFFIC FROM KDD CUP 99 DATA
SET
Type of Traffic TCP UDP ICMP
No. of PCs 3 PCs 5 PCs 6 PCs 7 PCs 3 PCs 4 PCs 5 PCs
plot of accumulative variances in the election of the optimal
feature subspaces. The up-slope on the plot indicates the
potential optimal subspace for data representation. Thus, we
can eliminate those less important PCs and retain only the
first a few critical PCs to form a new low dimensional feature
space.
To determine the number of critical PCs to be retained
for various types of network traffic in our evaluators, the
accumulative variance plots for normal TCP, UDP and ICMP
traffic extracted from KDD Cup 99 data set are shown in
Figs. 6a-6c respectively. The horizontal axes of the figures
stand for the number of PCs, and the vertical axes of the
figures represent the accumulative variances with respect to
the numbers of PCs shown on the horizontal axes. The up-
slopes on the plots for TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic are found
lying at the first two PCs, the first six PCs and the first four
PCs respectively. The same result is seen in ISCX 2012 IDS
evaluation data set. However, these numbers are not always
practicable, and the best performance may be achieved around
these numbers. For instance, using only the first two PCs to
represent the TCP traffic is not applicable in our detection
system. This is because the maps (i.e., TAM) constructed
using only two features are always identical for all records
after normalisation. Hence, we will choose the first three PCs
instead of the first two PCs.
2) Training Phase: In the Training Phase of the Decision
Marking (Step 3) shown in Fig. 2, profiles are generated with
respect to various types (i.e., TCP, UDP and ICMP) of Normal
traffic records. Moreover, as the plots of the accumulative
variances only suggest the preliminary results, we need to
conduct further selection based on the suggestion from the
preliminary outcomes from Section IV-B1. In this work, we
test three sets of PCs for each types of traffic, except TCP
traffic. According to the reason given in Section IV-B1, we
decide to use the first three PCs for TCP traffic only. The
numbers of PCs used in the further selection are given in Table
I. Normal profiles are built with respect to the chosen feature
subspaces (i.e., the aforementioned numbers of PCs). Then,
the generated normal profiles are utilised in the Test Phase.
3) Test Phase: During the Test Phase of the Decision
Marking shown in Fig. 2, we test our proposed detection
system against both the Normal records and the attack records
in the evaluation data set. The thresholds with respect to
different normal profiles are determined given the parameter
α varying from 1 to 3 with an increment of 0.5. The tests
run against the various sets of PCs (i.e., the selected lower
dimensional subspaces) shown in Table I. The best perfor-
mance is achieved on the first three PCs for TCP traffic and
the first five PCs for both UDP and ICMP traffic. Tables II
and III present the corresponding experimental results for our





























































For Peer Review Only
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, VOL., NO., 11












(a) Accumulative variance plot for TCP traffic







(b) Accumulative variance plot for UDP traffic







(c) Accumulative variance plot for ICMP traffic
Fig. 6. Accumulative variance plots for TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic from
KDD Cup 99 data set
proposed detection system on KDD Cup 99 data set and ISCX
2012 IDS evaluation data set respectively.
TABLE II
FALSE POSITIVE RATES, DETECTION RATES AND ACCURACIES
ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSED SYSTEM BASED ON KDD CUP 99 DATA
SET
Threshold
1σ 1.5σ 2σ 2.5σ 3σ
FPR 1.93% 1.19% 0.63% 0.60% 0.58%
DR 100.00% 99.83% 99.68% 99.68% 93.35%
Accuracy 99.95% 99.81% 99.67% 99.67% 93.50%
As shown in Tables II and III, the threshold controls the
degree of the dissimilarity, which is accepted by the system,
between a test object and the respective learnt normal profile.
If the dissimilarity is beyond the determined threshold, the
test object is classified as an attack. On one hand, it can
be seen clearly from Tables II and III that a better FPR is
achieved when a greater threshold is accepted. On the other
hand, greater thresholds produce lower DRs.
To provide a visualisation for the trade-off between Ac-
curacy and Threshold, Fig. 7 is given below. The proposed
detection system enjoys promising performance on KDD Cup
99 data set with 99.95% accuracy when the threshold is set
to 1σ. The accuracy of the both systems declines stably to
99.67% at the threshold of 2.5σ. After this point, the proposed
detection system based on TAM drops significantly to 93.50%.
When evaluating using ISCX 2012 IDS evaluation data
set, the proposed detection system achieves slightly lower but
remaining desirable accuracy (i.e., 90.12%) at the threshold
of 1σ. However, the accuracy falls down to 51.54% when the
threshold sits at 1.5σ. While the threshold reaches to 3σ, the
accuracy drops to its minimum 46.15%.
Although our proposed detection system does not perform
as good as on KDD Cup 99 data set, these results verify that
it is capable of coping with current networks (e.g., ISCX 2012
IDS evaluation data set). The ever-evolving complex network
architectures and sophisticated network intrusion skills account
for this degradation in detection accuracy on ISCX 2012 IDS
evaluation data set. Employing a Collaborative IDS (CIDS)
framework, in which standalone fellow IDSs cooperate with
each other to share information and to construct a complete
attack diagram of an entire protected network, could help
improve detection accuracy [45]. However, this is out of the
scope of the work presented in this paper and will be studied
in our feature research.
C. Comparison of Performance
To show a clearer picture that how our proposed DoS
attack detection system performs, we, on one hand, make
comparisons with three state-of-the-art detection systems on
their detection accuracy achieved on KDD Cup 99 data set in
this section. The best performance of these systems is selected
and shown in Table IV. The comparison results illustrate that
our proposed detection system based on EMD in cooperation
with TAM-based MCA achieves 99.95% accuracy on KDD
Cup 99 data set, which considerably outperforms the two
other systems and remains consistent with one of my previous
systems in terms of detection accuracy.
TABLE III
FALSE POSITIVE RATES, DETECTION RATES AND ACCURACIES
ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSED SYSTEM BASED ON ISCX 2012 IDS
EVALUATION DATA SET
Threshold
1σ 1.5σ 2σ 2.5σ 3σ
FPR 7.92% 4.75% 3.33% 2.00% 1.25%
DR 90.04% 49.82% 49.64% 49.48% 44.09%
Accuracy 90.12% 51.54% 51.41% 51.31% 46.15%
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TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS WITH DIFFERENT DETECTION APPROACHES ON KDD CUP 99 DATA SET
Network intrusion detection based
on covariance feature space [11]
(Threshold approach with 4D prin-




A system for DoS attack detec-
tion using TAM-based MCA
[13] (Normalized data, Thresh-
old = 1.5σ)
The proposed DoS attack
detection system based on
TAM and EMD (Threshold
= 1σ)
Accuracy 97.89% 92.15% 99.95% 99.95%
Those two systems, namely covariance feature space based
network intrusion detection system [11] and network intru-
sion detection using triangle-area-based nearest neighbours
approach [12], achieve 97.89% and 92.15% accuracy on KDD
Cup 99 data set respectively. The system that we previously
developed, namely a system for DoS attack detection using
TAM-based MCA [13], maintains 99.95% detection accuracy
on KDD Cup 99 data set.
On the other hand, we compare the detection performance
of our proposed detection system on ISCX 2012 IDS Eval-
uation data set with those achieved by four other detection
approaches (e.g., Naive Bayes (NB), Bagged-NB, Boosted-
NB and AMGA2-NB) discussed [46]. The reported FPRs
and DRs of these four detection approaches are recapped in
Table V. Although they achieve higher DRs than our proposed
detection system, their detection rates are not reported for
DDoS attacks only but also take other attacks into account. So,
it cannot confirm if these approaches do perform better than
our proposed system on DDoS attack detection. In addition, it
is also reported that none of these four detection approaches
deliver a DR that is higher than 70% on DoS attacks from
KDD Cup 99 data set [46]. This might indicate that none of
these four approaches in fact outperforms our proposed DoS
attack detection system.
TABLE V
FALSE POSITIVE RATES AND DETECTION RATES ACHIEVED BY THE
APPROACHES REPORTED IN [46] ON ISCX 2012 IDS EVALUATION DATA
SET (INCLUDING DDOS ATTACKS AND OTHER ATTACKS)
Reported Detection Approaches
NB Bagged-NB Boosted-NB AMGA2-NB
FPR 64.5% 62.2% 64.5% 4.8%




















The proposed system on ISCX 2012 IDS 
Evaluation Dataset 
The proposed system on KDD Cup 99 
Data set 
Fig. 7. Correlation between accuracy and threshold
Although, in comparison with our previous work shown
in [13], the proposed DoS attack detection system does not
show a significant advance in terms of detection accuracy,
it is worth noticing that the proposed system easily achieves
the equal performance requiring significantly less information
(i.e., fewer features involved in analysis and detection). This
reduces the computational overhead.
V. ANALYSIS ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND
TIME COST
In this section, we conduct an analysis on the computational
complexity of our proposed detection system in two ways (i.e.,
the complexity of the feature extraction and the complexity of
the detection) and on its time cost.
As discussed in Section III-A5a, during feature extraction,
triangle areas formed involving possible combinations of two
distinct features in a traffic record need to be computed when
processing the TAM-based MCA approach, which delivers
a computational complexity of O(m2) due to the fact that
m2 triangle areas are generated and are used to construct a
TAM as well. However, as the TAM is a symmetric matrix
and the elements along the main diagonal of the matrix are
zeros, the numbers of the computation of this MCA approach
can be reduced by more than 50% when it is put into
practise. Whereas, this does not reduce their computational
complexities. In attack detection, EMD-L1 [14] is applied. As
explained in Section III-A4, EMD-L1 incurs a complexity of
O(N2), where N = m2 is the number of elements within
a TAM. Thus, taking the computational complexities of the
feature extraction and the detection into account, the overall
computational complexity of the proposed detection system is
O(m2) +O(m4) = O(m4).
Network intrusion detection system based on covariance
feature space [11] incurs a computational complexity of
O(2n × m×(m+1)2 ) = O(nm2) in data preprocessing, where
n is the number of sequential samples in a group and m
is the number of physical features of a sample. In attack
detection, the observed covariance matrix of a group of
sequential samples needs to be compared with all l known
classes/clusters. Therefore, it has a computational complexity
of O(lm2). The overall computational complexity of the net-
work intrusion detection system based on covariance feature
space is O(nm2) +O(lm2) = O(lm2)
Triangle-area-based nearest neighbours approach [12] has
an overall computational complexity of O(ml2) + O(l2n2),
in which O(ml2) and O(l2n2) are complexities of the data
preprocessing and the attack detection respectively (m is the
number of features in a traffic record, l is the number of
clusters used in generating triangle areas and n is the number
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TABLE VI





tection based on covari-





of training samples). The complexity can be rewritten as
O(l2n2).
In general, our proposed detection system can achieve
comparable computational complexity to the two other ap-
proaches. Table VI is provided to summarise the computational
complexities of the above discussed approaches. Moreover,
time cost is discussed to demonstrate the capability of our
proposed detection system in data processing. Approximately
59,738 traffic records can be proceeded per second by our
DoS attack detection system in cooperation with TAM-based
MCA.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a DoS attack detection system
which is equipped with our previously developed MCA tech-
nique and the EMD-L1. The former technique helps extract the
correlations between individual pairs of two distinct features
within each network traffic record and offers more accurate
characterisation for network traffic behaviours. The latter
technique facilitates our system to be able to effectively distin-
guish both known and unknown DoS attacks from legitimate
network traffic.
Evaluation has been conducted using the KDD Cup 99
data set and ISCX 2012 IDS evaluation data set to verify
the effectiveness and performance of the proposed DoS attack
detection system. The results have revealed that our detection
system achieves maximum 99.95% detection accuracy on
KDD Cup 99 data set and 90.12% detection accuracy on ISCX
2012 IDS evaluation data set. It outperforms three state-of-the-
art approaches on KDD Cup 99 data set and shows advantages
over the four NB-based detection approaches on ISCX 2012
IDS evaluation data set. Moreover, we have analysed the
computational complexity of the proposed detection system,
which achieves comparable performance in comparison with
state-of-the-art approaches. The time cost analysis shows that
the proposed detection system is able to cope with high speed
network segments.
As our future research focus, a new CIDS will be invented
based on the detection approach proposed in this article. The
new CIDS will contribute an enhancement to the security
of the increasingly important Cloud computing environments
with its capability of handling sophisticated cooperative intru-
sions.
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Reviewers 2 and 3 recommend accepting this manuscript with NO changes. Reviewers 1 and 4 
recommend a minor revision and a major revision respectively. We respond to the reviewers' 
comments as follows. 
Responses to Reviewer 1’s comments 
No. Comments Revisions 
1 The paper proposes an interesting and 
potentially novel approach to the DoS 
detection issue. 
We thank the reviewer’s acknowledgement. 
2 The Abstract mentions the evaluation of the 
proposed approach but does not present 
details of the actual results observed (e.g. % 
effectiveness and operational cost). 
We thank the reviewer’s comment. As 
suggested, the actual detection accuracy and 
time cost of the proposed detection system have 
been detailed in the second last sentence of the 
Abstract. 
3 1) The Introduction claims that DoS 
attacks pose serious threats to IT 
infrastructures, but does not present any 
supporting evidence (e.g. from surveys, 
threat reports etc) to illustrate the point.  
2) Similarly, it is asserted that toolkits are 
readily available and anyone can use 
them; it would be good to have some 
evidence of (for example) the scale of 
the actual problem that arises as a result. 
1) To respond the reviewer’s comment, [1] has 
been cited as evidence to support the claim. 
2) To respond the reviewer’s comment, [2] and 
[3] have cited as evidence to support the 
claim. 
4 The later part of the Introduction indication 
that the observed accuracy of the system is 
“competitive to the previous systems”, and 
it may be worth indicating the associated 
percentages for them as well at this point. 
The associated percentages of our proposed 
system over the previous works have been 
listed in detail. Please see the second and third 
last sentence in the second last paragraph of the 
Introduction on page 2.   
5 Section II presents a reasonable literature 
review in terms of identifying related works 
within the scope outlined at the start of the 
section. However, one aspect that feels 
The results observed from the prior systems 
have been reported in Section II as suggested.  
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lacking is an indication of the 
results/effectiveness observed from the prior 
systems that are mentioned here. 
6 Section III.A presents good discussion of 
the general mechanisms and the motivations 
behind them. 
We thank the reviewer’s acknowledgement. 
7 It is notable that, by the time of its mention 
midway through the discussion on page 6, 
the choice of the KDD Cup 99 dataset has 
not yet been fully explained. 
We thank the reviewer’s comment.  
However, the features in KDD Cup 99 data set 
are just some examples. Raw features 
mentioned in Section III-A5 could be features 
other than those in KDD Cup 99 data set.  
8 Section III as a whole serves to describe the 
proposed approach in a significant amount 
of detail. 
We thank the reviewer’s acknowledgement. 
9 Section IV proceeds to present the rationale 
for the KDD Cup 99 dataset, and 
emphasizes the claim that the age of the 
data is not a factor in this case. Nonetheless, 
it would be useful to be able to include an 
explicit statement regarding the 
applicability of the proposed techniques to 
use with more modern attacks and current 
styles of network traffic. 
We thank the reviewer’s comments and respond 
the comments as follows. 
First of all, new attacks will mostly likely bear 
deviate patterns/behaviours than normal traffic. 
So, modern attacks can remain being found 
deviating from the current styles of network 
traffic. 
Furthermore, our approach is to model normal 
network traffic. As long as the model is trained 
and updated with the up-to-date network traffic, 
it is capable of current network. 
Finally, a new up-to-date data set, namely ISCX 
2012 IDS Evaluation Dataset, has been used to 
evaluate our proposed detection system. 
10 Tables II and III do not appear to be very 
useful or informative as currently presented.  
1) In the case of Table II, the information 
could be stated without needing a table. 
2) For Table III, it is unclear from the table 
why UDP and ICMP have multiple PC 
values. 
1) The original Table II has been removed 
from the manuscript as suggested. The 
numbers of principal components for the 
respective network traffic are now specified 
in the text. Please see the last paragraph of 
Section IV-B1 on page 10. 
2) We thank the reviewer’s comment. The 
reason why UDP and ICMP have multiple 
PC values has been discussed in the last 
paragraph of Section IV-B1. Since the best 
performance may be achieved around the 
numbers that we pick according to 
accumulative variance plots, we should test 
the numbers before and after the picked 
ones. Thus, we have chosen two sets of 
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three different values for UDP and ICMP 
respectively. In addition, the original Table 
III, which is now Table I, has been revised 
to enhance its readability.  
11 Figure 7 could usefully be enlarged to 
enhance readability. 
Figure 7 has been enlarged as suggested. 
12 The paper as a whole could benefit from 
some proof-reading in order to eradicate 
(minor) language issues (e.g. two examples 
from p12 – “it is worth notice” should be “it 
is worth noticing”; “in two folds” should be 
“in two ways”). 
We have done our best to eradicate all language 
issues that we could identify. 
13 The overall results to date appear positive in 
terms of both accuracy and computational 
complexity. It would be worth extending the 
conclusion to discuss how the authors plan 
to take things forward from this basis. 
As suggested, a new paragraph, discussing our 
future research focus, has been included in the 
Conclusion. Please see the last paragraph on 
page 13 for details. 
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Responses to Reviewer 2’s comments 
No. Comments Revisions 
1 This paper proposed an innovative 
research about original network intrusion 
detection problem into a computer vision 
task. A new scheme transforms the 
network traffic records into computer 
vision tasks. Multivariate Correlation 
Analysis approaches are proposed to 
improve the computing accuracy and 
accelerate. In the data pre-treatment 
partial, principal component analysis 
algorithm is introduced to reduce the data 
dimension. In the network traffic attack 
detection partial, Earth Mover’s Distance 
model is employed to calculate the 
similarity between observed traffic record 
and normal profiles. This new method is 
able to distinguish known and unknown 
DoS attack from legitimate network 
traffic. 
We sincerely thank the reviewer’s 
acknowledgement. 
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Responses to Reviewer 3’s comments 
No. Comments Revisions 
1 The paper is well written and easy to 
read. The structure and the analysis of the 
proposed image based DoS detection 
system are well presented. Performance 
of the proposed system exceeds or 
matches those of the existing state of the 
art detection systems. 
We sincerely thank the reviewer’s 
acknowledgement. 
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Responses to Reviewer 4’s comments 
No. Comments Revisions 
1 This paper proposes a new method to 
detect Internet distributed denial of 
service attacks from a computer vision 
perspective. This paper makes significant 
contribution to the field. However, there 
are many details need more investigation. 
The methodology is sound; I do 
appreciate its merits. However, the 
justification of using such methodology 
should be given in details. 
We thank the reviewer’s comment.  
Justification regarding the proposed methodology 
has been presented in Sections I (the fifth 
paragraph on page 2) and III-A4 (the first 
paragraph on page 5).  
2 The key weakness of this paper is the 
evaluation method and dataset.  
1) There have been many types of 
distributed denial of service attacks. 
Therefore, different methods and 
datasets should be used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the p oposed 
system. The authors should give 
specific methods and datasets, and 
give justification of using such 
methods and datasets.  
2) In the paper, the dataset used, is not 
convincing, as it is a very old dataset, 
which cannot reflect the real situation 
of the current Internet. Newer 
datasets should be used. 
We thank the reviewer’s comment.  
1) As suggested, justification for choosing KDD 
Cup 99 data set and ISCX 2012 IDS 
evaluation data set has been given in the 
second and fourth paragraph of Section IV on 
pages 9 and 10 respectively, and justification 
for the chosen evaluation method has been 
given in the second paragraph of Section IV-B 
on page 10. 
2) As suggested, a new data set, namely ISCX 
2012 IDS Evaluation Dataset, has been used to 
evaluate our proposed detection system. Please 
see Section IV for details. 
3 The thresholds selected for attack 
detection is arbitrary. This method is not 
adaptive. There have been many other 
adaptive methods, such as CUSUM (and 
the authors should cite this paper). The 
proposed system does not show 
advantages against the previous methods. 
We thank the reviewer’s comment.  
1) The threshold is determined according to the 
distribution theory. For each traffic model, 
there are always five candidate thresholds, 
namely 1σ, 1.5σ, 2σ, 2.5σ and 3σ, for 
choosing. σ is the standard deviation of the 
distribution of Earth Mover’s Distance. We 
choose the final threshold for a traffic model 
according to its empirical performance in 
testing. 
2) CUSUM has been cited. Please see reference 
[22]. 
3) Incremental (adaptive) learning version of our 
detection system has been introduced in the 
last paragraph of Section III-C2 on page 9. 
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4 November, 2014 
Dear Prof. Zomaya: 
I am pleased to submit an original research article entitled “Detection of Denial-of-Service Attacks Based on Computer 
Vision Techniques” by Zhiyuan Tan, Aruna Jamdagni, Xiangjian He, Priyadarsi Nanda, Ren Ping Liu and Jiankun Hu for 
consideration for publication in the IEEE Transactions on Computers.  
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A System for Denial-of-Service Attack Detection
Based on Multivariate Correlation Analysis
Zhiyuan Tan, Aruna Jamdagni, Xiangjian He, Senior Member, IEEE,
Priyadarsi Nanda, Member, IEEE, and Ren Ping Liu, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Interconnected systems, such as Web servers, database servers, cloud computing servers and so on, are now under
threads from network attackers. As one of most common and aggressive means, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks cause serious impact
on these computing systems. In this paper, we present a DoS attack detection system that uses multivariate correlation analysis
(MCA) for accurate network traffic characterization by extracting the geometrical correlations between network traffic features. Our
MCA-based DoS attack detection system employs the principle of anomaly based detection in attack recognition. This makes our
solution capable of detecting known and unknown DoS attacks effectively by learning the patterns of legitimate network traffic only.
Furthermore, a triangle-area-based technique is proposed to enhance and to speed up the process of MCA. The effectiveness of our
proposed detection system is evaluated using KDD Cup 99 data set, and the influences of both non-normalized data and normalized
data on the performance of the proposed detection system are examined. The results show that our system outperforms two other
previously developed state-of-the-art approaches in terms of detection accuracy.
Index Terms—Denial-of-service attack, network traffic characterization, multivariate correlations, triangle area
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DoS) attacks are one type of aggres-sive and menacing intrusive behavior to online servers.
DoS attacks severely degrade the availability of a victim,
which can be a host, a router, or an entire network. They
impose intensive computation tasks to the victim by
exploiting its system vulnerability or flooding it with huge
amount of useless packets. The victim can be forced out of
service from a few minutes to even several days. This
causes serious damages to the services running on the
victim. Therefore, effective detection of DoS attacks is
essential to the protection of online services. Work on DoS
attack detection mainly focuses on the development of
network-based detection mechanisms. Detection systems
based on these mechanisms monitor traffic transmitting
over the protected networks. These mechanisms release the
protected online servers from monitoring attacks and
ensure that the servers can dedicate themselves to provide
quality services with minimum delay in response. More-
over, network-based detection systems are loosely coupled
with operating systems running on the host machines
which they are protecting. As a result, the configurations of
network-based detection systems are less complicated than
that of host-based detection systems.
Generally, network-based detection systems can be
classified into two main categories, namely, misuse-based
detection systems [1] and anomaly based detection systems
[2]. Misuse-based detection systems detect attacks by
monitoring network activities and looking for matches with
the existing attack signatures. In spite of having high
detection rates to known attacks and low false-positive
rates, misuse-based detection systems are easily evaded by
any new attacks and even variants of the existing attacks.
Furthermore, it is a complicated and labor intensive task to
keep signature database updated because signature gen-
eration is a manual process and heavily involves network
security expertise.
Research community, therefore, started to explore a
way to achieve novelty-tolerant detection systems and
developed a more advanced concept, namely, anomaly
based detection. Owing to the principle of detection, which
monitors and flags any network activities presenting
significant deviation from legitimate traffic profiles as
suspicious objects, anomaly based detection techniques
show more promising in detecting zero-day intrusions that
exploit previous unknown system vulnerabilities [3].
Moreover, it is not constrained by the expertise in network
security, due to the fact that the profiles of legitimate
behaviors are developed based on techniques, such as data
mining [4], [5], machine learning [6], [7], and statistical
analysis [8], [9]. However, these proposed systems
commonly suffer from high false-positive rates because
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the correlations between features/attributes are intrinsi-
cally neglected [10] or the techniques do not manage to
fully exploit these correlations.
Recent studies have focused on feature correlation
analysis. Yu et al. [11] proposed an algorithm to discrimi-
nate DDoS attacks from flash crowds by analyzing the flow
correlation coefficient among suspicious flows. A covar-
iance matrix-based approach was designed in [12] to mine
the multivariate correlation for sequential samples.
Although the approach improves detection accuracy, it is
vulnerable to attacks that linearly change all monitored
features. In addition, this approach can only label an entire
group of observed samples as legitimate or attack traffic but
not the individuals in the group. To deal with the above
problems, an approach based on triangle area was pre-
sented in [13] to generate better discriminative features.
However, this approach has dependence on prior knowl-
edge of malicious behaviors. More recently, Jamdagni et al.
[14] developed a refined geometrical structure-based
analysis technique, where Mahalanobis distance (MD) was
used to extract the correlations between the selected packet
payload features. This approach also successfully avoids the
above problems, but it works with network packet pay-
loads. In [15], Tan et al. proposed a more sophisticated
nonpayload-based DoS detection approach using multi-
variate correlation analysis (MCA). Following this emerging
idea, we present a new MCA-based detection system to
protect online services against DoS attacks in this paper,
which is built upon our previous work in [16]. In addition to
the work shown in [16], we present the following contribu-
tions in this paper. First, we develop a complete framework
for our proposed DoS attack detection system in Section 2.1.
Second, we propose an algorithm for normal profile
generation and an algorithm for attack detection in
Sections 4.1 and 4.3, respectively. Third, we proceed a
detailed and complete mathematical analysis of the pro-
posed system and investigate further on time cost in
Section 6. As resources of interconnected systems (such as
Web servers, database servers, cloud computing servers,
etc.) are located in service providers’ local area networks
that are commonly constructed using the same or alike
network underlying infrastructure and are compliant with
the underlying network model, our proposed detection
system can provide effective protection to all of these
systems by considering their commonality.
The DoS attack detection system presented in this paper
employs the principles of MCA and anomaly based
detection. They equip our detection system with capabilities
of accurate characterization for traffic behaviors and
detection of known and unknown attacks, respectively. A
triangle area technique is developed to enhance and to
speed up the process of MCA. A statistical normalization
technique is used to eliminate the bias from the raw data.
Our proposed DoS detection system is evaluated using
KDD Cup 99 data set [17] and outperforms the state-of-the-
art systems shown in [13] and [15].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We
give the overview of the system architecture in Section 2.
Section 3 presents a novel MCA technique. Section 4
describes our MCA-based detection mechanism. Section 5
evaluates the performance of our proposed detection
system using KDD Cup 99 data set. Section 6 shows the
systematic analysis on the computational complexity and
the time cost of the proposed system. Finally, conclusions
are drawn and future work is given in Section 7.
2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The overview of our proposed DoS attack detection system
architecture is given in this section, where the system
framework and the sample-by-sample detection mechanism
are discussed.
2.1 Framework
The whole detection process consists of three major steps as
shown in Fig. 1. The sample-by-sample detection mechan-
ism is involved in the whole detection phase (i.e., Steps 1, 2,
and 3) and is detailed in Section 2.2.
In Step 1, basic features are generated from ingress
network traffic to the internal network where protected
servers reside in and are used to form traffic records for a
well-defined time interval. Monitoring and analyzing at the
destination network reduce the overhead of detecting
malicious activities by concentrating only on relevant
inbound traffic. This also enables our detector to provide
protection which is the best fit for the targeted internal
network because legitimate traffic profiles used by the
detectors are developed for a smaller number of network
services. The detailed process can be found in [17].
Step 2 is multivariate correlation analysis, in which the
“triangle area map generation” module is applied to extract
the correlations between two distinct features within each
traffic record coming from the first step or the traffic record
normalized by the “feature normalization” module in this
step (Step 2). The occurrence of network intrusions cause
changes to these correlations so that the changes can be
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Fig. 1. Framework of the proposed denial-of-service attack detection system.
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used as indicators to identify the intrusive activities. All the
extracted correlations, namely, triangle areas stored in
triangle area maps (TAMs), are then used to replace the
original basic features or the normalized features to
represent the traffic records. This provides higher discrimi-
native information to differentiate between legitimate and
illegitimate traffic records. Our MCA method and the
feature normalization technique are explained in Sections 3
and 5.2, respectively.
In Step 3, the anomaly based detection mechanism [3] is
adopted in decision making. It facilitates the detection of
any DoS attacks without requiring any attack relevant
knowledge. Furthermore, the labor-intensive attack analysis
and the frequent update of the attack signature database in
the case of misuse-based detection are avoided. Meanwhile,
the mechanism enhances the robustness of the proposed
detectors and makes them ha der to be evaded because
attackers need to generate attacks that match the normal
traffic profiles built by a specific detection algorithm. This,
however, is a labor-intensive task and requires expertise in
the targeted detection algorithm. Specifically, two phases
(i.e., the “training phase” and the “test phase”) are involved
in decision making. The “normal profile generation”
module is operated in the “training phase” to generate
profiles for various types of legitimate traffic records, and
the generated normal profiles are stored in a database. The
“tested profile generation” module is used in the “test
phase” to build profiles for individual observed traffic
records. Then, the tested profiles are handed over to the
“attack detection” module, which compares the individual
tested profiles with the respective stored normal profiles. A
threshold-based classifier is employed in the “attack
detection” module to distinguish DoS attacks from legit-
imate traffic. The detailed algorithm is given in Section 4.
2.2 Sample-by-Sample Detection
Jin et al. [12] systematically proved that the group-based
detection mechanism maintained a higher probability in
classifying a group of sequential network traffic samples
than the sample-by-sample detection mechanism. Whereas
the proof was based on an assumption that the samples in
a tested group were all from the same distribution (class).
This restricts the applications of the group-based detection
to limited scenarios, because attacks occur unpredictably in
general and it is difficult to obtain a group of sequential
samples only from the same distribution.
To remove this restriction, our system in this paper
investigates traffic samples individually. This offers benefits
that are not found in the group-based detection mechanism.
For example, 1) attacks can be detected in a prompt manner
in comparison with the group-based detection mechanism,
2) intrusive traffic samples can be labeled individually,
and 3) the probability of correctly classifying a sample into
its population is higher than the one achieved using the
group-based detection mechanism in a general network
scenario. To better understand the merits, we illustrate
them through a mathematical example given in [12],
which assumes traffic samples are independent and
identically distributed [12], [18], [19], and legitimate
traffic and illegitimate traffic follow normal distributions
X1  Nð1; 21Þ and X2  Nð2; 22Þ, respectively. The two
distributions are described statistically using the probability









 ¼ 1=2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2p eðx2Þ2=222 ; respectively, where
x 2 ð1; þ1Þ. In this task, the sample-by-sample labeling
and the group-based labeling are used to identify the
correct distribution for the individuals from a group of k
independent samples fx1; x2; . . . ; xkg.
In [12], on one hand, Jin et al. defined the probabilities of
correctly classifying a sample into its distribution using the
sample-by-sample labeling as the cumulative distribution



















where  ¼ 1  21þ2 þ 2  11þ2 is the threshold value for
classifying a sample into one of the two distributions
Nð1; 21Þ and Nð2; 22Þ. P 01 ¼ 1 P1 represents the prob-
ability that a sample coming from the distribution Nð1; 21Þ
is not correctly classified into X1. P
0
2 ¼ 1 P2 represents the
probability that a sample coming from the distribution
Nð2; 22Þ is not correctly classified into X2. As proven in
[12] that 1) P1 ¼ P2 ¼ P and P 01 ¼ P 02 ¼ 1 P , 2) the
samples are independently distributive, and 3) the results
of classification follow the binomial distribution, the
probability of correctly labeling j samples is defined as
PrðjÞ ¼ CjkP jð1 P Þkj where j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k. Thus, the
probability of correctly classifying all k samples is
PrðkÞ ¼ Pk: ð3Þ
On the other hand, to classify the same group of
independent samples fx1; x2; . . . ; xkg using the group-based
labeling, a new random variable z, which is the mean of k
random samples from the distribution Nðl; 2l Þ, is defined
as z ¼ 1k
Pk
t¼1 xt, where xt 2 Xl and l ¼ 1; 2. Clearly, the new
random variable z follows the distribution Zl  Nðl; 1k 2l Þ in
which l ¼ 1; 2. The threshold value for classification is
u ¼ 1  21þ2 þ 2  11þ2 . Since the random variable z is
generated utilizing k random samples xt from the distribu-
tion Nðl; 2l Þ, the detection precision rate of the z correctly
classified into the respective distribution Nð1; 21Þ or

































As proven in [12], we have that q1 ¼ q2, q01 ¼ 1 q1, and
q02 ¼ 1 q2.
The z above represents a group of samples completely
coming from the same distribution Nð1; 21Þ or Nð2; 22Þ.
However, in practice, samples may come from either
distribution independently so that the probability of having
a group of samples which come only from a single
distribution Nð1; 21Þ or Nð2; 22Þ is 1=2k. Thus, the
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probability of correctly classifying all k samples by using
group-based labeling is
k ¼ 1; QðkÞ ¼ q1 ¼ q2; ð6Þ






Considering the same example given in [12, p. 2,188]
where k is set to 16, the precision of the sample-by-sample
labeling achieves Prð16Þ ¼ P 16 ¼ 0:6316 ¼ 6.1581e-04, and
q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0:90824 when using group-based labeling. The
precision of the group-based labeling achieving in the
general network scenario is Qð16Þ ¼ 1216 q1 ¼ 1216  0:90824 ¼
1.3859e-05. Clearly, the sample-by-sample labeling and the
group-based labeling perform differently in detection pre-
cision. The relationship between the detection precisions of
two detection mechanisms can be found by analyzing (3),
(6), and (7). As shown in (8) and (9), when k equals to 1, the
probability of correctly classifying all k samples using
the sample-by-sample labeling is same as the one using the
group-based labeling. If k is greater than 1, both probabilities
PrðkÞ andQðkÞ decrease gradually, but the one of the group-
based labeling drops faster in comparison with that of the
sample-by-sample labeling, i.e.,
k ¼ 1; PrðkÞ ¼ QðkÞ; ð8Þ
k > 1; PrðkÞ > QðkÞ: ð9Þ

Therefore, the sample-by-sample labeling can always
achieve equal or better detection precision than the group-
based labeling.
3 MULTIVARIATE CORRELATION ANALYSIS
DoS attack traffic behaves differently from the legitimate
network traffic, and the behavior of network traffic is
reflected by its statistical properties. To well describe these
statistical properties, we present a novel MCA approach in
this section. This MCA approach employs triangle area for
extracting the correlative information between the features
within an observed data object (i.e., a traffic record). The
details are presented in the following.
Given an arbitrary data set X ¼ fx1; x2; . . . ; xng, where
xi ¼ ½fi1 fi2 . . . fimT , ð1  i  nÞ represents the ith m-
dimensional traffic record. We apply the concept of
triangle area to extract the geometrical correlation between
the jth and kth features in the vector xi. To obtain the
triangle formed by the two features, data transformation
is involved. The vector xi is first projected on the (j; k)th
2D euclidean subspace as yi;j;k ¼ ½"j "kTxi ¼ ½fij fikT ,
(1  i  n, 1  j  m, 1  k  m, j 6¼ k). The vectors "j ¼
½ej;1 ej;2 . . . ej;mT and "k ¼ ½ek;1 ek;2 . . . ek;mT have ele-
ments with values of zero, except the (j; j)th and (k; k)th
elements whose values are ones in "j and "k, respectively.
The yi;j;k can be interpreted as a 2D column vector, which
can also be defined as a point on the Cartesian coordinate
system in the (j; k)th 2D euclidean subspace with
coordinate (fij , f
i
k). Then, on the Cartesian coordinate
system, a triangle fijOf
i
k formed by the origin and the
projected points of the coordinate (fij , f
i
k) on the j-axis and
k-axis is found. Its area Trij;k is defined as
Trij;k ¼
kfij ; 0 ð0; 0Þ k  k 0; fik ð0; 0Þ kÞ=2; ð10Þ
where 1  i  n, 1  j  m, 1  k  m, and j 6¼ k. To make
a complete analysis, all possible permutations of any two
distinct features in the vector xi are extracted and the
corresponding triangle areas are computed. A TAM is
constructed and all the triangle areas are arranged on the
map with respect to their indexes. For example, the Trij;k is
positioned on the jth row and the kth column of the map
TAMi, which has a size of mm. The values of the
elements on the diagonal of the map are set to zeros
(Trij;k ¼ 0, if j ¼ k) because we only care about the
correlation between each pair of distinct features. For the
nondiagonal elements Trij;k and Tr
i
k;j where j 6¼ k, they
indeed represent the areas of the same triangle. This infers
that the values of Trij;k and Tr
i
k;j are actually equal. Hence,
the TAMi is a symmetric matrix having elements of zero on
the main diagonal.
When comparing two TAMs, we can imagine them as
two images symmetric along their main diagonals. Any
differences, identified on the upper triangles of the images,
can be found on their lower triangles as well. Therefore, to
perform a quick comparison of the two TAMs, we can
choose to investigate either the upper triangles or the lower
triangles of the TAMs only. This produces the same result
as comparing using the entire TAMs (see Appendix 1,
which can be found on the Computer Society Digital
Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
TPDS.2013.146). Therefore, the correlations residing in a
traffic record (vector xi) can be represented effectively and
correctly by the upper triangle or the lower triangle of the
respective TAMi. For consistency, we consider the lower
triangles of TAMs in the following sections. The lower
triangle of the TAMi is converted into a new correlation
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For the aforementioned data set X, its geometrical multi-
variate correlations can be represented by XTAMlower ¼
fTAM1lower; TAM2lower; . . . ; TAMilower; . . . ; TAMnlowerg.
When putting into practice, the computation of the Trij;k
defined in (10) can be simplified because the value of the
Trij;k is eventually equal to half of the multiplication of the
absolute values of fij and f
i
k. Therefore, the transformation
can be eliminated, and (10) can be replaced by Trij;k ¼
ðjfij j  jfikjÞ=2.
The above explanation shows that our MCA approach
supplies with the following benefits to data analysis. First, it
does not require the knowledge of historic traffic in
performing analysis. Second, unlike the Covariance matrix
approaches proposed in [12] which is vulnerable to linear
change of all features, our proposed triangle-area-based
MCA withstands the problem. Third, it provides character-
ization for individual network traffic records rather than
model network traffic behavior of a group of network traffic
records. This results in lower latency in decision making
and enable sample-by-sample detection. Fourth, the corre-
lations between distinct pairs of features are revealed
through the geometrical structure analysis. Changes of
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these structures may occur when anomaly behaviors appear
in the network. This provides an important signal to trigger
an alert.
4 DETECTION MECHANISM
In this section, we present a threshold-based anomaly
detector, whose normal profiles are generated using purely
legitimate network traffic records and utilized for future
comparisons with new incoming investigated traffic
records. The dissimilarity between a new incoming traffic
record and the respective normal profile is examined by
the proposed detector. If the dissimilarity is greater than a
predetermined threshold, the traffic record is flagged as an
attack. Otherwise, it is labeled as a legitimate traffic record.
Clearly, normal profiles and thresholds have direct
influence on the performance of a threshold-based detec-
tor. A low-quality normal profile causes an inaccurate
characterization to legitimate network traffic. Thus, we first
apply the proposed triangle-area-based MCA approach to
analyze legitimate network traffic, and the generated
TAMs are then used to supply quality features for normal
profile generation.
4.1 Normal Profile Generation
Assume there is a set of g legitimate training traffic records
Xnormal ¼ fxnormal1 ; xnormal2 ; . . . ; xnormalg g. The triangle-area-
based MCA approach is applied to analyze the records.
The generated lower triangles of the TAMs of the set of





lower ; . . . ; TAM
normal;g
lower g.
Mahalanobis distance is adopted to measure the dis-
similarity between traffic records. This is because MD has
been successfully and widely used in cluster analysis,
classification and multivariate outlier detection techniques.
Unlike euclidean distance and Manhattan distance, it
evaluates distance between two multivariate data objects
by taking the correlations between variables into account
and removing the dependence on the scale of measurement
during the calculation.
Fig. 2 presents the algorithm for normal profile
generation, in which the normal profile Pro is built
through the density estimation of the MDs between
individual legitimate training traffic records (TAMnormal;ilower )
and the expectation (TAMnormallower ) of the g legitimate
training traffic records. The MD is computed using (14)
and the covariance matrix (Cov) involved in (14) can be

















































The covariance between two arbitrary elements in the lower













 Trnormal;il;v  Trnormall;v :
ð13Þ
Moreover, the mean of the ðj; kÞth elements and the mean of
the ðl; vÞth elements of TAMs over g legitimate training
































As shown in Fig. 2, the distribution of the MDs is
described by two parameters, namely the mean  and the
standard deviation  of the MDs. Finally, the obtained
distribution Nð; 2Þ of the normal training traffic records,
TAMnormallower and Cov are stored in the normal profile Pro for
attack detection.
4.2 Threshold Selection
The threshold given in (16) is used to differentiate attack
traffic from the legitimate one
Threshold ¼ þ   : ð16Þ
For a normal distribution,  is usually ranged from 1 to 3.
This means that detection decision can be made with a
certain level of confidence varying from 68 to 99.7 percent in
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Fig. 2. Algorithm for normal profile generation based on triangle-area-
based MCA.
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association with the selection of different values of . Thus,
if the MD between an observed traffic record xobserved and
the respective normal profile is greater than the threshold, it
will be considered as an attack. Attack detection is detailed
in Section 4.3.
4.3 Attack Detection
To detect DoS attacks, the lower triangle (TAMobservedlower ) of
the TAM of an observed record needs to be generated
using the proposed triangle-area-based MCA approach.
Then, the MD between the TAMobservedlower and the TAM
normal
lower
stored in the respective pregenerated normal profile Pro is
computed using (15). The detailed detection algorithm is
shown in Fig. 3.
5 EVALUATION OF THE MCA-Based DoS ATTACK
DETECTION SYSTEM
The evaluation of our proposed DoS attack detection system
is conducted using KDD Cup 99 data set [17]. Despite the
data set is criticised for redundant records that prevent
algorithms from learning infrequent harmful records [21], it
is the only publicly available labeled benchmark data set,
and it has been widely used in the domain of intrusion
detection research. Testing our approach on KDD Cup 99
data set contributes a convincing evaluation and makes the
comparisons with other state-of-the-art techniques equita-
ble. Additionally, our detection system innately withstands
the negative impact introduced by the data set because its
profiles are built purely based on legitimate network traffic.
Thus, our system is not affected by the redundant records.
During the evaluation, the 10 percent labeled data of KDD
Cup 99 data set is used, where three types of legitimate
traffic (TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic) and six different types
of DoS attacks (Teardrop, Smurf, Pod, Neptune, Land and
Back attacks) are available. All of these records are first
filtered and then are further grouped into seven clusters
according to their labels (see Table 9 in Appendix 4, which is
available in the online supplemental material).
The overall evaluation process is detailed as follows:
First, the proposed triangle-area-based MCA approach is
assessed for its capability of network traffic characteriza-
tion. Second, a tenfold cross-validation is conducted to
evaluate the detection performance of the proposed MCA-
based detection system, and the entire filtered data subset
is used in this task. In the training phase, we employ only
the normal records. Normal profiles are built with respect
to the different types of legitimate traffic using the
algorithm presented in Fig. 2. The corresponding thresh-
olds are determined according to (16) given the parameter
 varying from 1 to 3 with an increment of 0.5. During the
test phase, both the Normal records and the attack records
are taken into account. As given in Fig. 3, the observed
samples are examined against the respective normal
profiles which are built based on the legitimate traffic
records carried using the same type of transport layer
protocol. Third, four metrics, namely, true-negative rate
(TNR), detection rate (DR), false-positive rate (FPR), and
accuracy (i.e., the proportion of the overall samples which
are classified correctly), are used to evaluate the proposed
MCA-based detection system. To be a good candidate, our
proposed detection system is required to achieve a high
detection accuracy.
5.1 Results and Analysis on Original Data
5.1.1 Network Traffic Characterization Using Triangle-
Area-Based Multivariate Correlation Analysis
In the evaluation, the TAMs of the different types of traffic
records are generated using 32 continuous features. The
images for the TAMs of Normal TCP record, Back attack
record, Land attack record, and Neptune attack record are
presented in Fig. 4. More results can be found in
Appendix 2, which is available in the online supplemental
material. The images demonstrate that TAM is a symmetric
matrix, whose upper triangle and lower triangle are
identical. The brightness of an element in an image
represents its value in the corresponding TAM. The greater
the value is, the brighter the element is. The images in Fig. 4
also demonstrate that our proposed MCA approach fulfils
the anticipation of generating features for accurate network
traffic characterization.
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Fig. 3. Algorithm for attack detection based on Mahalanobis distance.
Fig. 4. Images of TAMs of normal TCP traffic, Back, Land and Neptune
attacks generated using original data.
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5.1.2 Tenfold Cross-Validation
To evaluate the performance of our detection system along
with the change of the threshold, the average TNRs for
legitimate traffic and the average DRs for the individual
types of DoS attacks are shown in Table 1.
Throughout the evaluation, our proposed detection
system achieves encouraging performance in most of the
cases except Land attack. The rate of corr ct classification of
the Normal records rises from 98.74 to 99.47 percent along
with the increase of the threshold. Meanwhile, the Smurf
and Pod attack records are completely detected without
being affected by the change of the threshold. Moreover, the
system achieves nearly 100 percent DRs for the Back attacks
in almost all cases. However, the detection system suffers
serious degeneration in the cases of the Teardrop and
Neptune attacks when the threshold is greater than 1:5.
The DRs for these two attacks drop sharply to 48.45 and
52.96 percent, respectively, while the threshold is set to 3.
To have a better overview of the performance of our
MCA-based detection system, the overall FPR and DR are
highlighted in Table 2. The overall FPR and DR are
computed over all traffic records regardless the types of
attacks. When the threshold grows from 1 to 3, the FPR
drops quickly from 1.26 to 0.53 percent. Correspondingly,
the DR also drops from 95.11 to 86.98 percent while the
threshold rises. It shows clearly in the table that a larger
number of legitimate traffic records are covered by a greater
threshold, and more DoS attack records are incorrectly
accepted as legitimate traffic in the meantime.
5.2 Problems with the Current System and Solution
Although the detection system achieves a moderate overall
detection performance in the above evaluation, we want to
explore the causes of degradation in detecting the Land,
Teardrop, and Neptune attacks.
Our analysis shows that the problems come from the
data used in the evaluation, where the basic features in the
non-normalized original data are in different scales. There-
fore, even though our triangle-area-based MCA approach is
promising in characterization and clearly reveals the
patterns of the various types of traffic records, our detector
is still ineffective in some of the attacks. For instance, the
Land, Teardrop and Neptune attacks whose patterns are
different than the patterns of the legitimate traffic. How-
ever, the level of the dissimilarity between these attacks and
the respective normal profiles is close to that between
the legitimate traffic and the respective normal profiles.
Moreover, the changes appearing in some other more
important features with much smaller values can hardly
take effect in distinguishing the DoS attack traffic from the
legitimate traffic, because the overall dissimilarity is
dominated by the features with large values. Nevertheless,
the non-normalized original data contains zero values in
some of the features (both the important and the less
important features), and they confuse our MCA and make
many new generated features (Trij;k) equal to zeros. This
vitally degrades the discriminative power of the new
feature set (TAMilower), which is not supposed to happen.
Apparently, an appropriate data normalization techni-
que should be employed to eliminate the bias. We adopt
the statistical normalization technique [20] to this work.
The statistical normalization takes both the mean scale of
attribute values and their statistical distribution into
account. It converts data derived from any normal
distribution into standard normal distribution, in which
99.9 percent samples of the attribute are scaled into [3, 3].
In addition, statistical normalization has been proven
improving detection performance of distance-based classi-
fiers and outperforming other normalization methods,
such as mean range [0, 1], ordinal normalization and so
on [20].
Considering the same arbitrary data set X ¼ fx1;
x2; . . . ; xng given in Section 3, the statistical normalization
is defined as follows: The normalized value of feature fij is




j is the mean









is the standard deviation of feature fij . The normalized
feature vector xi is represented by ½Fi1 Fi2 . . .FimT in which
1  i  n. In the following evaluation, the data are
normalized in a batch manner. However, real-time normal-
ization can be achieved through the incremental learning
[22] when our detection system is put online. The mean fi
can be updated as fi ¼ fi þ xnþ1 finþ1 .
5.3 Results and Analysis on Normalized Data
To verify our observation, a tenfold cross-validation is
conducted as done in Section 5.1.2 on the data normalized
using the aforementioned statistical normalization techni-
que. The results are given in Section 5.3.1.
5.3.1 Tenfold Cross-Validation
The detection performance based on the normalized data is
given in Table 3. The results reveal that the data does have
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TABLE 1
Average Detection Performance of the Proposed System
on Original Data against Different Thresholds
TABLE 2
Detection Rate and False-Positive Rate Achieved
by the Proposed System on Original Data
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significant influence on our detection system, whose
overall performance increases dramatically when taking
the normalized data as the inputs. The Teardrop, Neptune,
and Land attacks, which are mostly miss-classified in the
previous evaluation, now can be completely classified
correctly by the system along the increase of the threshold.
Except the Back attacks, the other types of DoS attacks are
detected completely regardless of the change of the thresh-
old as well. Although the detection system claims only a
93.56 percent DR in detecting the Back attacks in the worst
case, its DR rises stably and slowly to 99.32 percent when
the a more rigorous threshold is chosen. The ineffectiveness
of the statistical normalization technique on the Back
attacks is caused by the fact that the non-normalized
features of the Back attacks originally fall in similar scales
as the ones of the legitimate traffic so that after data
normalization there is no improvement on the detection of
the Back attacks. In comparison with the TNR of our
detection system achieved on the non-normalized Normal
records, the one achieved on the normalized Normal
records declines a bit to maximum 98.75 percent when the
threshold is set to 3. However, it manages to remain in
the reasonable range.
Then, similar to the previous evaluation, we show the
overall FPR and DR in Table 4. The FPR shown in the
table drops nearly 1 percent when the threshold increases
from 1 to 2. Finally, it reaches to 1.25 percent while the
threshold is staying at 3. The DR of the system varies
from 100.00 to 99.96 percent. It is clearly seen that the
proposed detection system achieves a better DR with the
normalized data.
5.3.2 Performance Comparisons
To make complete comparisons, the ROC curves of the
previous two evaluations are shown in Fig. 5. The
relationship between DR and FPR is clearly revealed in
the ROC curves. The DR increases when larger numbers
of false positive are tolerated. In Fig. 5a, the ROC curve
for analyzing the original data using our proposed
detection system shows a rising trend. The curve climbs
gradually from 86.98 to 89.44 percent DR, and finally
reaches to 95.11 percent DR. Likewise, the ROC curve for
analyzing the normalized data presents a resembling
pattern but jumps dramatically from 99.97 to 99.99 percent
DR after experiencing slow progress as shown in Fig. 5b.
Then, the curve remains in a high level of DR around
100.00 percent. It is shown clearly in Fig. 5 that our
detection system always enjoys higher detection rates
while working with the normalized data than with the
original data. The worst performance (99.96 percent DR
and 1.25 percent FPR) of our system shown in Fig. 5b is
even much better the best performance (95.11 percent DR
and 1.26 percent FPR) in term of detection rate shown in
Fig. 5a.
Last but not the least, two state-of-the-art detection
approaches, namely, triangle area-based nearest neighbors
approach [13] and euclidean distance map-based approach
[15] are selected to compare with our proposed detection
system. The best accuracies on detecting DoS attacks
achieved by the various approaches and systems are given
in Table 5. Although all approaches and systems high-
lighted in Table 5 have high accuracies on DoS attack
detection, our proposed MCA-based detection system
(95.20 percent for the original data and 99.95 percent for
the normalized data) clearly outperforms the triangle area-
based nearest neighbors approach (92.15 percent). In
addition, our proposed detection system cooperating with
normalized data (99.95 percent) shows a marginal advan-
tage over the approach based on euclidean distance map
(99.87 percent). Although this is a narrow lead, our
detection system shows more promising especially when
it is deployed on a production network with a throughput
of 1 Gbps. Due to a significantly fewer number of false
alarms generated per second, network administrators will
be much less interrupted by the false information.
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TABLE 4
Detection Rate and False-Positive Rate Achieved by the
Proposed System on Normalized Data
TABLE 3
Average Detection Performance of the Proposed System on
Normalized Data against Different Thresholds
Fig. 5. ROC curves for the detection of DoS attacks.
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6 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND TIME COST
ANALYSIS
In this section, we conduct an analysis on the computational
complexity and the time cost of our proposed MCA-based
detection system.
On one hand, as discussed in Section 3, triangle areas of
all possible combinations of any two distinct features in a
traffic record need to be computed when processing our
proposed MCA. Since each traffic record has m features (or
dimensions), mðm1Þ2 triangle areas are generated and are
used to construct a TAMilower. Thus, the proposed MCA has
a computational complexity of Oðm2Þ. On the other hand, as
explained in Section 4.3, the MD between the observed
feature vector (i.e., the TAMilower) and TAM
normal
lower of the
respective normal profile needs to be computed in the
detection process of our proposed detection system to
evaluate the level of the dissimilarity between them. Thus,
this computation incurs a complexity of OðM2Þ, in which
M ¼ mðm1Þ2 is the dimensions of TAMilower. OðM2Þ can be
written as Oðm4Þ. By taking the computational complexities
of the proposed MCA and the detection process of our
proposed detection system into account, the overall
computational complexity of the proposed detection system
is Oðm2Þ þOðm4Þ ¼ Oðm4Þ. However, m is a fixed number
which is 32 in our case, so that the overall computational
complexity is indeed equal to Oð1Þ.
Similarly, approach based on euclidean distance map [15]
achieves the same computational complexities of Oðm2Þ and
Oðm4Þ in data processing and attack detection, respectively.
Moreover, thenumberof features (m) inuse is identical to that
used in our proposed detection system as well. Thus, the
overall computational complexity of the euclidean distance
map-based approach is Oð1Þ. For another state-of-the-art
detection approach thatwe compared in theprevious section,
triangle area-based nearest neighbors approach [13] suffers a
heavier overall computational complexity. Indata processing
and attack detection phases, the computational complexities
are Oðml2Þ andOðl2n2Þ, respectively, wherem is the number
of features (or dimensions) in a traffic record, l is the number
of clusters used in generating triangle areas and n is the
number of training samples. The overall complexity is
Oðml2Þ þOðl2n2Þ ¼ Oðl2n2Þ. In general, our proposed detec-
tion system can achieve equal or better computational
complexity than the above two other approaches. Table 6 is
provided to summarize the computational complexities of
the above discussed approaches.
Moreover, time cost is discussed to show the contribu-
tion of our proposed MCA in terms of acceleration of data
processing. Our proposed MCA can proceed approximately
23,092 traffic records per second. In contrast, the MCA
based on euclidean distance map [15] can achieve approxi-
mately 12,044 traffic records per second, which is nearly less
than half of that achieved by our proposed MCA. Due to the
unavailability of the source code of triangle area-based
nearest neighbors approach [13], we cannot provide
comparison to it.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented an MCA-based DoS attack
detection system which is powered by the triangle-area-
based MCA technique and the anomaly-based detection
technique. The former technique extracts the geometrical
correlations hidden in individual pairs of two distinct
features within each network traffic record, and offers more
accurate characterization for network traffic behaviors. The
latter technique facilitates our system to be able to
distinguish both known and unknown DoS attacks from
legitimate network traffic.
Evaluation has been conducted using KDD Cup 99 data
set to verify the effectiveness and performance of the
proposed DoS attack detection system. The influence of
original (non-normalized) and normalized data has been
studied in the paper. The results have revealed that when
working with non-normalized data, our detection system
achieves maximum 95.20 percent detection accuracy
although it does not work well in identifying Land,
Neptune, and Teardrop attack records. The problem,
however, can be solved by utilizing statistical normalization
technique to eliminate the bias from the data. The results of
evaluating with the normalized data have shown a more
encouraging detection accuracy of 99.95 percent and nearly
100.00 percent DRs for the various DoS attacks. Besides, the
comparison result has proven that our detection system
outperforms two state-of-the-art approaches in terms of
detection accuracy. Moreover, the computational complex-
ity and the time cost of the proposed detection system have
been analyzed and shown in Section 6. The proposed
system achieves equal or better performance in comparison
with the two state-of-the-art approaches.
To be part of the future work, we will further test our
DoS attack detection system using real-world data and
employ more sophisticated classification techniques to
further alleviate the false-positive rate.
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TABLE 6
Computational Complexities of Different State-of-the-Art
Detection Approaches
TABLE 5
Performance Comparisons with Different Detection Approaches





























































For Peer Review Only
REFERENCES
[1] V. Paxson, “Bro: A System for Detecting Network Intruders in
Real-Time,” Computer Networks, vol. 31, pp. 2435-2463, 1999.
[2] P. Garca-Teodoro, J. Daz-Verdejo, G. Maci-Fernndez, and E.
Vzquez, “Anomaly-Based Network Intrusion Detection: Techni-
ques, Systems and Challenges,” Computers and Security, vol. 28,
pp. 18-28, 2009.
[3] D.E. Denning, “An Intrusion-Detection Model,” IEEE Trans.
Software Eng., vol. TSE-13, no. 2, pp. 222-232, Feb. 1987.
[4] K. Lee, J. Kim, K.H. Kwon, Y. Han, and S. Kim, “DDoS Attack
Detection Method Using Cluster Analysis,” Expert Systems with
Applications, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 1659-1665, 2008.
[5] A. Tajbakhsh, M. Rahmati, and A. Mirzaei, “Intrusion Detection
Using Fuzzy Association Rules,” Applied Soft Computing, vol. 9,
no. 2, pp. 462-469, 2009.
[6] J. Yu, H. Lee, M.-S. Kim, and D. Park, “Traffic Flooding Attack
Detection with SNMP MIB Using SVM,” Computer Comm., vol. 31,
no. 17, pp. 4212-4219, 2008.
[7] W. Hu, W. Hu, and S. Maybank, “AdaBoost-Based Algorithm for
Network Intrusion Detection,” IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics Part B, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 577-583, Apr. 2008.
[8] C. Yu, H. Kai, and K. Wei-Shinn, “Collaborative Detection of
DDoS Attacks over Multiple Network Domains,” IEEE Trans.
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 18, no. 12, pp. 1649-1662, Dec.
2007.
[9] G. Thatte, U. Mitra, and J. Heidemann, “Parametric Methods for
Anomaly Detection in Aggregate Traffic,” IEEE/ACM Trans.
Networking, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 512-525, Apr. 2011.
[10] S.T. Sarasamma, Q.A. Zhu, and J. Huff, “Hierarchical Kohonenen
Net for Anomaly Detection in Network Security,” IEEE Trans.
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, vol. 35, no. 2,
pp. 302-312, Apr. 2005.
[11] S. Yu, W. Zhou, W. Jia, S. Guo, Y. Xiang, and F. Tang,
“Discriminating DDoS Attacks from Flash Crowds Using Flow
Correlation Coefficient,” IEEE Trans. Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 1073-1080, June 2012.
[12] S. Jin, D.S. Yeung, and X. Wang, “Network Intrusion Detection in
Covariance Feature Space,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 40, pp. 2185-
2197, 2007.
[13] C.F. Tsai and C.Y. Lin, “A Triangle Area Based Nearest Neighbors
Approach to Intrusion Detection,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 43,
pp. 222-229, 2010.
[14] A. Jamdagni, Z. Tan, X. He, P. Nanda, and R.P. Liu, “RePIDS: A
Multi Tier Real-Time Payload-Based Intrusion Detection System,”
Computer Networks, vol. 57, pp. 811-824, 2013.
[15] Z. Tan, A. Jamdagni, X. He, P. Nanda, and R.P. Liu, “Denial-of-
Service Attack Detection Based on Multivariate Correlation
Analysis,” Proc. Conf. Neural Information Processing, pp. 756-765,
2011.
[16] Z. Tan, A. Jamdagni, X. He, P. Nanda, and R.P. Liu, “Triangle-
Area-Based Multivariate Correlation Analysis for Effective Denial-
of-Service Attack Detection,” Proc. IEEE 11th Int’l Conf. Trust,
Security and Privacy in Computing and Comm., pp. 33-40, 2012.
[17] S.J. Stolfo, W. Fan, W. Lee, A. Prodromidis, and P.K. Chan, “Cost-
Based Modeling for Fraud and Intrusion Detection: Results from
the JAM Project,” Proc. DARPA Information Survivability Conf. and
Exposition (DISCEX ’00), vol. 2, pp. 130-144, 2000.
[18] G.V. Moustakides, “Quickest Detection of Abrupt Changes for a
Class of Random Processes,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory,
vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 1965-1968, Sept. 1998.
[19] A.A. Cardenas, J.S. Baras, and V. Ramezani, “Distributed Change
Detection for Worms, DDoS and Other Network Attacks,” Proc.
The Am. Control Conf., vol. 2, pp. 1008-1013, 2004.
[20] W. Wang, X. Zhang, S. Gombault, and S.J. Knapskog, “Attribute
Normalization in Network Intrusion Detection,” Proc. 10th Int’l
Symp. Pervasive Systems, Algorithms, and Networks (ISPAN),
pp. 448-453, 2009.
[21] M. Tavallaee, E. Bagheri, L. Wei, and A.A. Ghorbani, “A Detailed
Analysis of the KDD Cup 99 Data Set,” Proc. IEEE Second Int’l
Conf. Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense Applications,
pp. 1-6, 2009.
[22] D.E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming Vol I: Fundamental
Algorithms. Addison-Wesley, 1973.
Zhiyuan Tan is working toward the PhD degree
at the Faculty of Engineering and Information
Technology, University of Technology, Sydney,
also a research member of Research Centre for
Innovation in IT Services and Applications
(iNEXT). His research interests include network
security, pattern recognition, machine learning,
and P2P overlay network.
Aruna Jamdagni received the PhD degree from
the University of Technology Sydney, Australia,
in 2012. She is a lecturer in the School of
Computing and Mathematics, University of
Western Sydney, Australia, and a research
member of Research Centre for Innovation in
IT Services and Applications (iNEXT) at the
University of Technology Sydney, Australia. Her
research interests include computer and net-
work security and on pattern recognition techni-
ques and fuzzy set theory.
Xiangjian He is a professor of computer science
at the School of Computing and Communica-
tions. He is also the director of Computer Vision
and Recognition Laboratory, the leader of Net-
work Security Research Group, and a deputy
director of Research Centre for Innovation in IT
Services and Applications (iNEXT), University of
Technology, Sydney. His research interests
include network security, image processing,
pattern recognition and computer vision. He
has been awarded Internationally Registered Technology Specialist by
International Technology Institute. He is a senior member of the IEEE.
He is the corresponding author.
Priyadarsi Nanda is a senior lecturer at the
School of Computing and Communications, and
is a core research member at the Centre for
Innovation in IT Services Applications (iNEXT).
His research interests include network QoS,
network securities, assisted health care using
sensor networks, and wireless networks. He has
more than 23 years of experience in teaching
and research, and has more than 40 research
publications. He is a member of the IEEE.
Ren Ping Liu is a principal scientist of network-
ing technology in CSIRO ICT Centre. His
research interests include Markov chain model-
ing, QoS scheduling, and security analysis of
communication networks. He has published
more than 70 papers in these areas in top
journals and conferences. In addition to his
research, he has also been heavily involved in
and led a number of commercial projects. As a
CSIRO consultant, he delivered networking
solutions to government and industrial customers, including Optus,
AARNet, Nortel, Queensland Health, CityRail, Rio Tinto, and DBCDE.
He is a member of the IEEE.
. For more information on this or any other computing topic,
please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
456 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS, VOL. 25, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2014
Page 31 of 31 Transactions on Computers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
